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Article 
Carbon Taxation by Regulation 
Jim Rossi† 
I.  INTRODUCTION   
In discussions about climate change, a national tax on car-
bon-producing activities is often favored over other carbon-re-
duction approaches because it is seen as efficient, fair, and 
straightforward.1 Politicians on both the left and right tout a car-
bon tax as a Hail Mary-type solution.2 MIT and University of 
 
†  Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I am grateful to James Cole-
man, David Dana, John Dernbach, Dan Farber, Michael Gerrard, Shi-Ling Hsu, 
Sharon Jacobs, Gary Lucas, Jonas Monast, Tracey Roberts, Chris Serkin, and 
Steve Weissman for their comments on a draft. Thanks also to participants at a 
Spring 2017 workshop at the University of North Carolina School of Law and 
at Columbia Law School’s Fall 2016 forum on deep decarbonization for their 
feedback. Copyright © 2017 by Jim Rossi. 
 1. Classic articles advocating for a carbon tax over alternative emissions 
regulation approaches such as cap-and-trade include: Michael Hoel & Larry 
Karp, Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant, 24 RESOURCE & ENERGY 
ECON. 367 (2002); Larry Karp & Jiangfeng Zhang, Regulation of Stock Exter-
nalities with Correlated Abatement Costs, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 273 
(2005); William D. Nordhaus, To Tax or Not To Tax: Alternative Approaches to 
Slowing Global Warming, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 26 (2007); Marc J. Rob-
erts & Michael Spence, Effluent Charges and Licenses Under Uncertainty, 5 J. 
PUB. ECON. 193 (1976); Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 477 (1974). 
 2. For advocates on the left, see ALISON CASSADY ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY: THE CASE FOR A PROGRESSIVE 
CARBON TAX (2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/ 
2016/12/16/295181/building-a-21st-century-economy; David Roberts, A Chat 
with Al Gore on Carbon Taxes, Natural Gas, and the “Morally Wrong” Keystone 
Pipeline, GRIST (Nov. 20, 2012), http://grist.org/climate-energy/a-chat-with-al 
-gore-on-carbon-taxes-natural-gas-and-the-morally-wrong-keystone-pipeline. 
Advocates on the right include: JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., CLIMATE LEADER-
SHIP COUNCIL, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CARBON DIVIDENDS (2017), 
https://www.clcouncil.org/media/TheConservativeCaseforCarbonDividends 
.pdf; Martin S. Feldstein et al., Opinion, A Conservative Case for Climate Action, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/opinion/a 
-conservative-case-for-climate-action.html; Bob Inglis & Arthur B. Laffer, Opin-
ion, An Emissions Plan Conservatives Could Warm To, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/opinion/28inglis.html. A number of 
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Chicago economists maintain that adoption of a national carbon 
tax could be necessary to reduce societal reliance on fossil fuels 
and meet greenhouse-gas-reduction targets,3 such as the United 
States’ goal of eighty percent greenhouse reduction by 2050.4 
Elon Musk has even taken the position that a carbon tax is as 
necessary to successful carbon reduction as garbage collection 
fees are to trash disposal.5 Of course, there is a lot to debate 
about the design of a carbon tax,6 but it stands out for its sim-
plicity and elegance.7 
In the United States, a carbon tax has also proved politically 
elusive. Legislative adoption of a national carbon tax is widely 
considered infeasible and is stalled, at least for the foreseeable 
future8—though a few scattered efforts to tax energy based on 
its carbon attributes have been adopted at subnational levels of 
 
private corporations, including some in the fossil fuel sector, have also voiced 
support for a national carbon tax. See Editorial, Even Big Oil Wants a Carbon 
Tax, BLOOMBERGVIEW (June 1, 2015), http://origin-www.bloombergview.com/ 
view/articles/2015-06-01/even-big-oil-wants-a-carbon-tax (noting that six of the 
world’s largest oil companies have come out in support of a carbon tax). 
 3. See Thomas Covert et al., Will We Ever Stop Using Fossil Fuels?, 30 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 117, 120 (2016) (arguing that certain policy choices are necessary 
to reduce fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions). 
 4. This is the target the United States set in its submission and pledge to 
the Paris Summit. See Simon Evans, U.S. Climate Pledge Promises To Push for 
Maximum Ambition, CARBONBRIEF (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.carbonbrief 
.org/us-climate-pledge-promises-to-push-for-maximum-ambition. 
 5. See Alan Boyle, Elon Musk Explains Why a Carbon Tax Is as Necessary 
as Garbage Collection Fees, GEEKWIRE (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.geekwire 
.com/2015/elon-musk-explains-carbon-tax-necessary-garbage-collection-fees. 
 6. For an excellent discussion of some of the core components of an optimal 
carbon tax design, see Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a 
Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009) (addressing the tax rate, dis-
tributional issues, and a need to address jurisdictional spillover effects through 
border adjustments). 
 7. See Editorial, Carbon Tax Is Best Option Congress Has, WASH. POST 
(May 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/carbon-tax-is-best 
-option-congress-has/2013/05/07/883f2184-aeaa-11e2-98ef-d1072ed3cc27_story 
.html (describing a carbon tax as “an elegant policy Congress could immediately 
take off the shelf ” and “one of the best ideas in Washington almost no one in 
Congress will talk about”); see also SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX 
10 (Island Press 2011). 
 8. One significant reason for this is the geographic obstacles presented by 
the Senate, which also have hobbled efforts to move forward with other carbon 
regulation initiatives. Cf. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 6, at 503, 555. An-
other reason relates to a lack of widespread voter support, due to a lack of psy-
chological appeal. See Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology and the Carbon Tax, 
90 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2 
.cfm?abstract_id=2915339. 
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government.9 Many scholars favor a carbon tax over other policy 
approaches, such as cap-and-trade.10 
While spirited, mainstream policy discussions about carbon 
taxation consistently ignore how energy regulation can, and in 
fact already does, effectuate some of the same goals as a carbon 
tax. This Article begins to fill that gap by advancing carbon tax-
ation by regulation—widespread and growing use of customer 
rate subsidies in energy law that already operate in a similar 
manner and serve parallel public goals to a carbon tax. Part of 
this endeavor is descriptive, and aims to show how energy regu-
lation already embraces forms of taxation as one of its primary 
regulatory tools in rate setting. This paper also advances a nor-
mative claim: energy law can better promote efficiency and social 
welfare by aligning the features of internal customer subsidies 
with the same principles that would inform design of a carbon 
tax. While customer rate subsidies, on their own, cannot provide 
all of the same benefits as a national tax that internalizes the 
externalities of all carbon-producing activities, a carbon tax of-
fers a benchmark for evaluating the efficacy of these internal 
subsidies. 
In Taxation by Regulation, published nearly half a century 
ago, Richard Posner questioned the common conceptual and op-
erational separation between two important, yet often distinct, 
government functions: regulation and taxation.11 He argued that 
one of the core functions of economic regulation is to perform dis-
tributive and allocative tasks, similar to those typically rele-
gated to tax policy.12 Cutting against economists and regulators 
who understand regulation as protecting consumers, mimicking 
the result of a competitive market, or enriching regulated firms, 
Posner observed that internal subsidies in utility rates can “be 
viewed as an exertion of state power whose purpose, like that of 
other taxes, is to . . . support a service that the market would 
 
 9. The idea of a carbon tax has not had significant political traction in 
states either. For discussion of state carbon tax initiatives, see ADELE C. MOR-
RIS ET AL., BROOKINGS, STATE-LEVEL CARBON TAXES: OPTIONS AND OPPORTU-
NITIES FOR POLICYMAKERS (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/07/State-level-carbon-taxes-Options-and-opportunities-for 
-policymakers.pdf. 
 10. See sources cited supra note 1. 
 11. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971) (noting that utility regulation can provide many of the 
same public good and redistribution functions as traditional forms of public tax-
ation). 
 12. Id. at 23. 
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provide at a reduced level, or not at all.”13 Though he did not set 
out to defend taxation by regulation, he identified some benefits 
it offers over alternative methods of financing public goods (such 
as general taxation of income or activities), including its ease of 
administration, legislative feasibility, protection of expectations, 
and propensity for justice.14 
In approaching climate policy, carbon taxation by regulation 
presents an immediate opportunity to advance many of these 
same benefits. Many scholars have sought to excavate the pro-
gressive ideals of public utility regulation as a way to promote 
important public goods for energy (such as consumer protec-
tion15 and reliability16) and the environment (such as carbon re-
duction17). My goal here is not to embrace carbon taxation by 
regulation as a backdoor way of achieving progressivity in cli-
mate policy. Rather, this Article argues that many efforts to ef-
fectuate carbon reduction are already embedded in the tools of 
modern energy regulation. I present examples that demonstrate 
how established approaches to setting customer energy rates can 
advance carbon reduction goals through traditional utility regu-
lation—an approach that should be embraced, not ignored, in 
policy discussions surrounding climate change. To date, how-
ever, these approaches have not achieved their full potential, 
and many customer subsidies work at cross-purposes. Using op-
timal design of a carbon tax as a benchmark, I also identify some 
principles to help guide the reform of customer rate setting and 
to maximize its effectiveness, efficiency, and customer-welfare 
benefits in the transition to a low-carbon energy sector. 
Part II of this Article illustrates how decades of unaligned 
approaches to taxation and regulation have contributed to sub-
stantial carbon lock-in in the energy sector. It will be a daunting 
challenge for the United States to meet its carbon reduction tar-
gets, for which some estimate new investment costs as high as 
 
 13. Id. at 29. 
 14. Id. at 45–47. 
 15. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty To Serve” and Protection of Con-
sumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 1233, 1241 n.27 (1998) (emphasizing how ratemaking helped to finance 
consumer protection as a public good). 
 16. See Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in 
the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 163–66 (2016) (emphasizing that relia-
bility is a public good that is not properly priced in interstate power markets). 
 17. See generally William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 1614 (2014) (arguing that carbon-reduction efforts can be ad-
vanced by looking back to progressive ideas from the early twentieth century). 
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six trillion dollars.18 No one, including staunch advocates of a 
carbon tax, expects government to pay for the new infrastructure 
investment that will be required in the decades to come.19 Novel 
and creative approaches to financing new power generation in-
vestments from the private sector will prove important to this 
power supply shift. However, market prices in energy often fail 
to reflect actual value.20 Many of the public goods associated 
with carbon reduction and grid reliability are under-produced by 
private energy markets.21 
But while Congress has been mired in the status quo, energy 
regulators have not stood still. Rather, federal and state energy 
regulators have drawn creatively on established customer rate-
setting tools to begin to transition the energy sector towards a 
low-carbon future. Part III describes how many state and federal 
policies adopted over the past few decades endorse the use of 
ratepayer subsidies (what, following Posner, I call internal sub-
sidies) to promote the impending transition to deep decarboniza-
tion, even without a carbon tax.22 Federal tax incentives for re-
sources like wind power have played some role in steering 
 
 18. See Geoffrey Heal, What Would It Take To Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 80% by 2050? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
22525, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22525. Put in context, this cost is 
achievable over a period of decades, as it represents less than half of the United 
States’ current annual gross domestic product. See id.; see also WORLD BANK, 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DATABASE 1 (Apr. 17, 2017), http://databank 
.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (listing the United States’ 2016 GDP at 
roughly $18.57 trillion). 
 19. Most do not envision a carbon tax as an allocation of new dollars to the 
public fisc to finance government-owned infrastructure investments, but as 
something that would be used to lower taxes or to fund grants or loans for pri-
vate clean-energy investments. See Editorial, The Case for a Carbon Tax, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/opinion/the-case-for 
-a-carbon-tax.html. 
 20. Long ago, economists including John Commons and Robert Lee Hale 
argued that price regulation needs to address the disparity between market (or 
nominal) prices and real value. See, e.g., JOHN COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECO-
NOMICS 225–26 (1934); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Lib-
erty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 625–26 (1943); see also BARBARA H. FRIED, THE 
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW 
AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (2001) (providing further insight into the work of 
Robert Lee Hale). 
 21. Cf. Hammond & Spence, supra note 16. 
 22. I focus primarily on the electric power grid as a means for doing this, in 
part because with any transition to vehicle electrification the electric sector is 
expected to increase carbon emissions and absorb many of the carbon impacts 
presently associated with the use of fossil fuels in the transportation sector. 
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investments, but represent only a portion of total subsidies pro-
moting investment in clean-energy infrastructure.23 Mandates 
such as renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) influence energy 
investment decisions in more than half the states.24 And for reg-
ulated utilities, these kinds of mandates are subsidized through 
rate increases.25 Retail customer charges, including time-of-day 
rates and billing approaches like net metering, have also influ-
enced customer demand and reduced the need for large-scale 
power generation.26 These mandates and charges reflect rate-
payer subsidies that support new carbon-abatement efforts and 
investments in clean-energy technology. They have widespread 
acceptance and, in effect, lay the groundwork for a type of below 
the radar carbon tax—albeit in a fragmented way.27  
Absent adoption of a national carbon tax, continuation and 
expansion of internal subsidies will prove necessary for grid de-
carbonization. However, their full potential will not be achieved 
without some reforms. Regulators routinely approve internal 
subsidies on an incremental basis, assessing them in isolation 
based on their effects on ratepayers and efficiency. However, 
given the interstate nature of modern energy markets, to suc-
cessfully advance carbon reduction without presenting market 
distortions, inefficiencies, and harms to consumers, the efficacy 
of various forms of subsidies must be evaluated side by side, bet-
ter coordinated between regulators, and scaled-up and recali-
brated. Part IV uses the optimal design of a carbon tax to iden-
tify some basic principles to help guide the reform of internal 
subsidies. These include some need to address revenue shortfalls 
for public goods and the efficiency of burden spreading, to pro-
mote fairness and notions of equity (both horizontal and verti-
cal), to minimize market distortions, and to mitigate regulatory 
spillovers and arbitrage. 
Part IV, also advances a menu of policy reforms to better 
advance carbon taxation by regulation in a principled manner. 
State regulators should not shy away from forms of carbon tax-
ation by regulation, even in interstate power markets, but they 
should consider use of innovative approaches to customer subsi-
dies and be more attentive to coordinating the jurisdictional 
 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See infra Part III.A. 
 26. See infra Part III.C. 
 27. See infra Part III.C. 
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spillover effects of internal subsidies. Recalibrating internal sub-
sidies to meet carbon-reduction targets could also benefit from 
policy shifts by the federal government. Even absent new legis-
lation from Congress, the executive branch already possesses 
significant authority to design better policies to align the inter-
nal subsidies of regulation with carbon tax benchmarks; agen-
cies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
also face a propitious opportunity to embrace new kinds of inter-
nal subsidies (for example, drawing on an excise tax for electric 
power transmission) to ensure that interstate energy markets 
better advance important public goods, including reliability and 
carbon reduction, on a nondiscriminatory basis. At the same 
time, clearer federal policies are needed to encourage more pri-
vate investment in low-carbon energy infrastructure, subna-
tional innovations, and better inter-governmental coordina-
tion.28 Even as Congress and the executive branch table 
ambitious national carbon-reduction requirements, energy regu-
lators are already pursuing carbon taxation by regulation in an 
incremental, fragmented, and uncoordinated manner. It is time 
to recognize the significance of internal subsidies in climate 
change policy and to identify the principles that can help to un-
leash their full potential for efficiency and social welfare. 
II.  THE INERTIA OF CARBON LOCK-IN   
The U.S. energy system suffers from “carbon lock-in,”29 
which will substantially impede the future transition to low-car-
bon energy supply. In 2016, carbon dioxide emissions by the elec-
tric power sector accounted for thirty-five percent of U.S. energy-
 
 28. For a discussion of the promise of setting floors for clean energy policy, 
see Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 
91 N.C. L. REV. 1283 (2013). 
 29. As Gregory Unruh describes: 
[I]ndustrial economies have become locked into fossil fuel-based tech-
nological systems through a path-dependent process driven by techno-
logical and institutional increasing returns to scale. This condition, 
termed carbon lock-in, arises through a combination of systematic 
forces that perpetuate fossil fuel-based infrastructures in spite of their 
known environmental externalities and the apparent existence of cost-
neutral, or even cost-effective, remedies. Rational corrective policy ac-
tions in the face of climate change would include removal of perverse 
subsidies and the internalization of environmental externalities aris-
ing from fossil fuel use. 
Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 817, 817 
(2000). 
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related emissions.30 Ninety-eight percent of these emissions 
came from natural gas and coal power plants.31 
To a large degree, carbon lock-in is the unintended conse-
quence of decades of stable governmental policies supporting in-
cumbent energy resources.32 For most of the twentieth century, 
tax incentives for fossil fuel production and widespread use of 
internal subsidies in utility rates together worked to give cus-
tomers low-cost, reliable energy, while also protecting investors 
in power plants that burn fossil fuels.33 Though independent in 
their design, both tax and internal subsidies continue to sustain 
a dated legacy of fossil fuel plants, comprising the bulk of energy-
supply resources.34 Recent policies favoring competitive inter-
state energy markets also prolong carbon lock-in by allowing 
grid operators to prioritize dispatch of the lowest-cost sources of 
energy, regardless of carbon-reduction attributes.35 These gov-
ernmental and market policies underscore the need for some 
principled strategy to overcome the inertia of carbon lock-in 
while also promoting public goods (such as carbon reduction) 
that energy markets do not presently value—one of the most sig-
nificant benefits offered by a carbon tax. 
A. TAX SUBSIDIES FOR THE FOSSIL FUEL LEGACY 
Past and ongoing federal tax policies reinforce fossil fuel 
power generation by influencing investments in incumbent 
power plants, oil and gas production fields and processing facili-
ties, and tens of thousands of miles of energy transportation in-
frastructure, such as pipelines and existing transmission lines.36 
Though renewable resources like wind have received significant 
 
 30. See How Much of U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Are Associated with 
Electricity Generation?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/ 
faqs/faq.php?id=77&t=11 (last updated May 10, 2017). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Unruh, supra note 29, at 824 (discussing government policies that 
have made investing in electric power plants appealing). 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. See infra Part II.A. 
 35. See infra Part II.C. 
 36. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY 
ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (William D. Nordhaus et al. eds., 2013), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/18299/chapter/1 (analyzing the results of a study 
looking at the United States’ tax policy and its effect on greenhouse gas emis-
sions); Tracey M. Roberts, Picking Winners and Losers: A Structural Examina-
tion of Tax Subsidies to the Energy Industry, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63 (2016) 
(discussing the history of tax subsidies available to the energy sector and the 
ways in which they support fossil fuel power generation). 
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tax subsidies in recent years,37 the Energy Information Admin-
istration (EIA) estimates that federal direct subsidies for fossil 
fuels in the United States continue to total around 3.4 billion 
dollars (in 2013 dollars).38 Direct ongoing financial transfers 
benefitting fossil fuel resources include, inter alia, artificially 
low governmental fees for use of public mineral rights, subsidies 
to the transportation sector and to waterways and ports, tax-ex-
empt debt, and longstanding favorable corporate tax treatment 
for oil and gas exploration and production (reducing the fuel 
costs associated with power generation from these sources).39 
While significant on their own terms, these dollar amounts 
of direct subsidies for fossil fuels significantly understate their 
economic significance for investment in the electric power sector. 
Decades of stable tax incentives have not only lowered asset and 
operational costs for fossil fuel resources; the stability of fossil 
fuel tax policy has created reliable expectations for investors, re-
ducing uncertainty and risks surrounding fossil fuel resource de-
velopment and use (which translates into a lower cost of capi-
tal).40 To the extent past infrastructure investment, such as 
power-generation facilities and pipelines or transmission lines 
(many located to provide fuel for and transport electricity from 
fossil fuel power plants), has benefited from past tax subsidies, 
a legacy of tax incentives continues to promote favorable produc-
tion costs for legacy fossil fuel power plants.41 
Longstanding and stable tax benefits for fossil fuels have 
also reduced the risks and costs of capital for electric utilities 
that rely predominantly on fossil fuel resources, giving them an 
advantage over non-incumbent power projects that do not burn 
fossil fuels—especially those facing high front-end construction 
costs. The oil depletion allowance in U.S. tax law (allowing com-
panies to treat oil in the ground as capital equipment for tax de-
preciation purposes) began in 1913 and continues to this day, 
providing value in the form of a predictable and consistent low-
 
 37. See infra Part III.B. 
 38. See Total Energy Subsidies Decline Since 2010, With Changes in Sup-
port Across Fuel Types, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www 
.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=20352 [hereinafter Total Energy Subsi-
dies Decline]. 
 39. See Roberts, supra note 36, at 75–103 (discussing the tax landscape for 
both fossil fuel resources and renewable energy resources, and the market re-
sponse to that landscape). 
 40. Cf. Unruh, supra note 29, at 823 (discussing the risk-averse nature of 
investors, which favors incumbent power generators). 
 41. Id. 
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tax investment climate for fossil fuel producers.42 This not only 
advantages producers, it also benefits the operators of power 
plants that burn their fuels. Fossil-fuel-producing master lim-
ited partnerships enjoy substantial federal tax benefits that are 
not available to wind or solar energy power project developers 
under current law.43 In addition, utilities (which pay income tax 
at the federal level, but often are allowed to pass through their 
costs to ratepayers in retail rates) have been able to use acceler-
ated tax depreciation of new power plants to generate tax bene-
fits for a project in its early years of operation.44 This can serve 
as a tax-free loan of sorts, which benefits investors in utilities 
with incumbent power-generation facilities to the extent that the 
utility’s customer rate base (as approved by state regulators) can 
depreciate power generation assets at a slower pace and receive 
a reliable rate of return that may not be available to other non-
utility project developers seeking accelerated tax depreciation.45 
These tax incentives provide financial stability for many past 
power-plant investments and prolong a utility’s economic incen-
tives to keep its legacy plants in operation long after their actual 
costs have been recovered.46 
Moreover, estimates of subsidies available to fossil fuel en-
ergy resources fail to recognize the social costs associated with 
different energy resources. The environmental consequences of 
continuing to use high-carbon energy-supply sources are rarely 
 
 42. See Rebecca Leber, Happy 100th Birthday, Big Oil Tax Breaks, 
THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 1, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/happy-100th 
-birthday-big-oil-tax-breaks-3c9731c4bc85. 
 43. David C. Magagna, Comment, Congress, Give Renewable Energy a Fair 
Fight: Passage of the Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act Would Give Re-
newable Energy the Financial Footing Needed To Independently Succeed, 27 
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 149, 150–51 (2016) (“In enacting favorable tax treatment for 
fossil fuel companies, Congress specifically neglected to extend the same bene-
fits to renewable energy companies.”). 
 44. See Roberts, supra note 36, at 99 n.243 (discussing the first-year bonus 
depreciation allowance in investment tax credits). 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 75–81 (focusing on the accelerated cost recovery provided 
by fossil fuel tax subsidies). 
 46. See, e.g., PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF OR. STAFF, TREATMENT OF INCOME 
TAXES IN UTILITY RATEMAKING 13 (2005), http://www.puc.state.or.us/leg/sb408/ 
white/taxpaper.pdf (discussing Oregon’s method of calculating income taxes for 
utility ratemaking, and the benefits of the current system for utilities); see also 
Roberts, supra note 36, at 137–38 (emphasizing differences in the tax environ-
ment for legacy energy resources, in comparison to new renewable power 
sources). 
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priced into investments decisions.47 Focusing on only the eco-
nomic benefits of tax subsidies fails to account for the possibility 
that different energy resources produce different public goods 
because they have different externalities. When taking this so-
cial cost into account, the International Energy Agency esti-
mates that global fossil fuel subsidies outstrip subsidies for re-
newable energy nearly ten-fold.48 The International Monetary 
Fund similarly notes that when the social cost of carbon is ac-
counted for, worldwide fossil fuel subsidies amount to five tril-
lion dollars per year.49 There is little doubt that past and present 
fossil fuel subsidies play a significant role in encouraging the de-
velopment of fossil fuel resources and their widespread use in 
transportation and electric-power generation.50 Continued pres-
ence of many tax subsidies for fossil fuel resources underscores 
a critical need for policymakers to reassess whether the current 
investment environment remains advantageous to the fossil fuel 
energy producers and their legacy infrastructure in comparison 
to lower-carbon alternatives. 
B. RATEMAKING AND THE EXISTING POWER GENERATION FLEET 
Beyond tax subsidies, state regulators’ traditional approach 
to setting retail rates based on the utility’s cost-of-service has 
allowed routine recovery of power-supply costs in the customer 
rate base. While many states have moved to the competitive pric-
ing of energy, the approach to utility ratemaking that most 
states continue to embrace allows a utility to recover expenses 
from ratepayers in the form of just and reasonable rates, based 
on the costs (including capital costs) of providing service to 
 
 47. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 16, at 171–72 (discussing the dif-
ficulty in pricing environmental externalities). 
 48. Giles Parkinson, The Myth About Renewable Energy Subsidies, CLEAN-
TECHNICA (Feb. 25, 2016), https://cleantechnica.com/2016/02/25/the-myth 
-about-renewable-energy-subsidies. 
 49. Id. Studies that incorporate environmental and energy security costs 
associated with fossil fuels in the United States estimate that annual direct and 
indirect subsidies exceed $121 billion (in 1999 dollars). Doug Koplow & John 
Dernbach, Federal Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Case 
Study of Increasing Transparency for Fiscal Policy, 26 ANN. REV. ENERGY & 
ENV’T 361, 366 (2001). 
 50. Cf. Parkinson, supra note 48 (explaining that fossil fuels have enjoyed 
stable government subsidies, whereas renewable energies receive inconsistent 
and ever-changing subsidization). 
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them.51 In approving expensive new power plants as prudent in-
vestments, rate regulators have consistently favored least-cost 
resources based on current economic conditions, often approving 
plants with excess capacity in order to accommodate projected 
growth in customer demand without any serious consideration 
of the environmental consequences.52  
Economists have long questioned the economic inefficiencies 
produced by cost-of-service ratemaking, which can distort asset 
investment decisions by perversely encouraging overinvestment 
in large-scale baseload (that is, must-run) power plants with 
high fixed costs (known among economists as the “Averch-John-
son” effect, or an inefficiently high capital-to-labor ratio).53 Over 
the past half century, state regulators routinely approved new 
fossil fuel and nuclear plants, with an expectation of continued 
expansion of customer demand.54 This encouraged construction 
of an existing electric power generation fleet (supported by a net-
work of transmission lines) that obtains roughly sixty-four per-
cent of its energy from fossil fuels and nearly twenty percent 
from nuclear power.55 Lower-carbon resources lag these more 
conventional power generation facilities by a significant margin, 
with non-hydroelectric renewables (such as wind, solar, and bio-
mass) supplying only eight percent of electric power needs,56 at 
least on their best day.57 Vertical integration of the utility also 
 
 51. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 16, at 150–51 (discussing utility 
rate regulation). 
 52. This is a very real and continuing problem for the energy sector. See 
Ivan Penn & Ryan Menezes, Californians Are Paying Billions for Power They 
Don’t Need, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fi 
-electricity-capacity (describing overinvestment in natural gas plants, most ap-
proved over the past decade). 
 53. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under 
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962). For a discussion 
of how state prudency review led to an overcapacity problem with baseload 
plants, see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mis-
takes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
497 (1984). 
 54. For an example of the problem, see Penn & Menezes, supra note 52. 
 55. See What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last updated Apr. 
18, 2017). 
 56. The EIA estimates coal and natural gas comprise sixty-four percent of 
the United States’ electricity generation in 2016. See id. 
 57. The on-their-best-day qualifier is important because looking at the 
overall production potential of various power generation facilities is not an ap-
ples-to-apples comparison: the capacity factor (or predicted annual output, 
based on the percentage of time the facility is producing energy) for wind and 
solar resources is significantly lower than baseload power plants, including 
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favored investment in centrally-located power-generation facili-
ties, leading to underinvestment in the interstate transmission 
grid to transport energy produced by other suppliers.58 
State and federal energy regulators’ primary focus on pro-
moting low-cost and dependable sources of energy, as they ap-
prove new plants and pass the costs through in customer rates, 
continues to exercise a firm grip over the existing power-supply 
fleet. Today, many fossil fuel resources and a large number of 
nuclear power plants no longer operate at a profit to their inves-
tor.59 Some of these sources are being retired, though many 
plants operate at less-than-full generation capacity, with firms 
increasingly looking to ratepayer subsidies to keep their plants 
in operation, often for reliability purposes.60 Transmission-grid-
reliability regulations also routinely favor baseload power 
plants—most fueled by coal and natural gas—though little seri-
ous attention is given to how other energy resources, such as 
wind power, distributed power generation, or demand response, 
might also promote reliability.61 Ongoing recovery for the 
stranded costs associated with existing coal and nuclear plants 
threatens to keep legacy power plants in operation decades be-
yond their originally-expected useful life, delaying any transi-
tion towards grid decarbonization.62 Significantly too, tradi-
tional approaches to utility ratemaking fixate on customer 
protection to the exclusion of other important public goods, such 
 
those using coal and many using natural gas. Compare Electric Power Monthly: 
Table 6.7.A. Capacity Factors for Utility Scale Generators Primarily Using Fos-
sil Fuels, January 2013–June 2017, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_6_ 
07_a, with Electric Power Monthly: Table 6.7.B. Capacity Factors for Utility 
Scale Generators Primarily Using Fossil Fuels, January 2013–June 2017, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/ 
epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_6_07_b. 
 58. For discussion of how traditional rate regulation led to underinvest-
ment in the grid and overinvestment in baseload power supply, see JIM ROSSI, 
REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW 54–61 (2005). 
 59. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 16, at 159–63 (discussing the some-
times higher-than-anticipated energy production costs for certain energy pro-
ducers). 
 60. A couple examples are highlighted in Penn & Menezes, supra note 52; 
see also Hammond & Spence, supra note 16 (detailing the importance of relia-
bility in the electricity generation market). 
 61. See, e.g., Hammond & Spence, supra note 16 (discussing the perceived 
poor reliability attributes of non-dispatchable resources, such as solar and wind 
power, in comparison to traditional fossil-fueled and nuclear base load plants).  
 62. See Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbon-
ization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 645, 646–47 (2017). 
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as energy conservation.63 By treating forecasted customer load 
as a given, or systematically erring in the direction of overesti-
mating demand growth, ratemaking has promoted wasteful con-
sumption of electric power, rather than energy conservation.  
Put simply, cost-of-service ratemaking for electric power en-
courages a utility to maximize its revenue, which under tradi-
tional approaches requires it to sell more energy.64 Without at-
tention to rate design65 and decoupling,66 utilities traditionally 
face no incentive to sell less energy, let alone to price the retail 
sale of energy in a manner that reflects its broader social costs 
rather than the financial costs of production.67 Many utilities 
continue to charge retail customers flat rates (that is, a constant 
price for each kilowatt hour (kWh) consumed), rather than vary 
customer rates based on peak time-of-day or seasonal con-
straints on the energy system. Utilities have little or no incen-
tives to sell less power or to pursue goals unrelated to maximiz-
ing customer revenue, which depends on total energy sales.68 
Any successful transition to deep decarbonization must be atten-
tive to customer demand and, in particular, how the pricing of 
energy impacts the demand for energy. Part of the hope behind 
a carbon tax is that pricing the carbon consequences of energy 
resources into the production of energy will be passed on to cus-
tomers and will, at least to some degree, affect their purchase 
decisions, reducing demand for energy and the need for future 
investments in power supply.69 
C. PUBLIC GOOD CHALLENGES IN COMPETITIVE ENERGY 
MARKETS 
Over the past twenty-five years the focus of federal energy 
policy has shifted from relying on energy subsidies to pay for var-
ious public goods associated with energy (such as grid reliabil-
ity), to relying on competitive energy markets to provide them. 
In theory, federal market policies would allocate energy re-
sources, price them, and set their investment incentives based 
 
 63. See, e.g., Penn & Menezes, supra note 52. 
 64. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for 
Us: The Financial Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
1527, 1545–46 (2012). 
 65. For discussion, see infra Part III.C. 
 66. For discussion, see infra Part III.A.2. 
 67. See Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 64. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See, e.g., id. 
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on how a competitive market matches supply and demand.70 
However, the reality of competitive energy markets does not 
match the theory. Energy resource market prices do not always 
reflect externalities, positive or negative. As others have ob-
served, competitive interstate energy markets have failed to 
price important public goods, such as the reliability and environ-
mental attributes associated with various energy resources.71 
FERC’s initiative to promote wholesale competition in the 
pricing of bulk power supply requires “open access” to interstate 
transmission lines on nondiscriminatory terms.72 In the most-
populous areas of the United States today, private Regional 
Transmission Operators (RTOs) coordinate bulk-power-supply 
transactions.73 FERC regulates these RTOs to ensure that 
wholesale energy prices are just and reasonable, typically by po-
licing whether a supplier possesses market power and enforcing 
rules to protect against fraudulent transactions.74 RTO grid op-
erators play a role similar to air traffic controllers, applying 
rules and guidelines to coordinate various power flows in order 
to maintain a stable and reliable power grid as the supply and 
demand for energy allows market prices to clear.75 
Like other markets, however, allocating energy supply in a 
competitive interstate power market with open access to trans-
mission favors the lowest cost, incumbent power generators over 
newer, and more expensive resources.76 Most RTO grid opera-
tors prioritize and dispatch energy resources on a least-cost ba-
sis.77 In this sense, market pressures continue to favor energy-
supply resources that have ready transmission-grid access and 
the lowest marginal operational (and fuel) costs—for many areas 
of the country, existing baseload resources such as coal and nat-
ural-gas plants.78 By contrast, most new low-carbon energy re-
sources can only come online once they have incurred high front-
 
 70. The Federal Power Act (FPA) delegates to FERC the regulation of in-
terstate wholesale energy markets and electricity transmission. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824(a) (2012). Under the FPA, states retain authority over power distribution 
and generation facilities and retail rates. See id. § 824(b)(1). 
 71. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 16. 
 72. Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs., 75 FERC ¶ 31,036, 18 C.F.R. pts. 
35 & 385 (1995), aff ’d, New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
 73. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 16, at 153. 
 74. See id. at 194. 
 75. See id. at 153. 
 76. See id. at 154–55. 
 77. See id. at 193. 
 78. For a discussion, see id. at 154–57. 
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end fixed costs and already have access to transmission—and 
they are often seen as intermittent in their ability to deliver en-
ergy in any event.79 
The transition to competitive energy markets makes the dis-
tortions presented by traditional federal tax incentives and tra-
ditional regulatory subsidies even more significant. Often, en-
ergy markets leave important public goods, such as customer 
reliability and environmental protection, unaddressed. A legacy 
of past investment decisions favoring incumbent energy suppli-
ers can obfuscate attention to these public goods. It is expected 
that the transition to a low-carbon energy system will lead to a 
decrease in expected investments in traditional fossil fuel plants 
and their operation, somewhere in the range of ten billion dollars 
per year.80 To the extent that these plants are already built (or 
under construction today) and are entitled to cost recovery over 
a period of decades through customer rates, decreases in these 
investments will prove especially challenging and lead to new 
calls for regulator relief for incumbent power suppliers.81 
Even more challenging, capital markets will need to shift 
investment resources towards lower-carbon sources of electric-
power supply and more efficient customer energy use. The mas-
sive infrastructure transition to a low-carbon energy system will 
not happen overnight. Nor will the government provide the cap-
ital necessary to achieve it. Rather, it will require decades of new 
private financial commitments, supported by complementary 
regulatory commitments in public law. One decarbonization sce-
nario relying on a balance of different energy resources antici-
pates annual electric power generation investments increasing 
by fifteen billion dollars per year from 2021–2030 and by over 
thirty billion dollars per year from 2031–2040.82 By 2050, the 
electricity sector would need more than fifty billion dollars per 
year of capital investment in electricity generation.83 A high-re-
newables case, with renewable energy making up the bulk of the 
power-supply portfolio, would require more than seventy billion 
 
 79. See id. 
 80. JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 48 (2014), http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ 
US-Deep-Decarbonization-Report.pdf. 
 81. This issue is addressed in Hammond & Rossi, supra note 62. 
 82. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 80, at 49. 
 83. Id. 
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dollars per year of new generation investments by 2050.84 The 
total cost of getting there could be as a high six trillion dollars.85 
Three impediments stand in the way of this transition: em-
bedded tax incentives that favor incumbent energy resources, 
the lack of reasonably priced transmission access for non-incum-
bent power supply resources, and a failure to price the carbon 
attributes of energy. 
As discussed above, in recent decades the federal govern-
ment has failed to reassess how embedded federal tax incentives 
advantage legacy fossil fuel resources that are not available to 
developers of new energy sources.86 Tax incentives may be im-
portant in promoting economic growth and investments in new 
technologies and, as is discussed below, many renewable energy 
resources have benefitted from these, albeit with considerable 
uncertainty.87 Despite significant direct tax incentives for re-
newable power resources, the federal tax code still fails to pro-
vide sufficient incentives to overcome the legacy advantages of 
incumbent energy-supply resources, nor does it advance a level 
playing field for low-carbon energy supply. Many existing dis-
parities in tax treatment give significant continuing-operation 
cost subsidies to legacy resources (primarily fossil fuel plants 
benefitting from decades of past tax advantages) and new plants 
burning natural gas also benefit from ongoing fuel-production 
tax subsidies and favorable partnership tax treatment, benefits 
that are unavailable to renewable power project developers.88 
Because of regulatory arbitrage,89 utilities owning power-gener-
ation resources also continue to benefit from tax benefits and de-
ductions (often further protected in customer rates) that are not 
available to nonutility suppliers of energy.90 
A second public good problem is that, while federal regula-
tors have embraced competitive markets in electric power sup-
ply, federal policies surrounding the expansion of electric-power 
transmission and its pricing remain weak. On the one hand, 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Heal, supra note 18. 
 86. See supra Part II.A. 
 87. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 88. See supra Part II.A. 
 89. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
 90. See Rich Heidorn, Jr., EEI Pledges To Fight Elimination of Tax Deduc-
tions, RTO INSIDER (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.rtoinsider.com/eei-investor 
-owned-utilities-38425 (noting that current tax deductions allow utilities oppor-
tunities to reduce their weighted cost of capital in comparison to other firms). 
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FERC’s fixation on competitive power supply markets has in-
vited firms and regulators to approach transmission pricing and 
investment decisions with a laissez faire attitude, ignoring it un-
til a market or reliability crisis requires governmental interven-
tion.91 On the other hand, FERC’s open-access policies are 
grounded on the principle that electric-power transmission oper-
ates much like a natural monopoly.92 Recognizing how transmis-
sion is subject to monopoly abuses potentially subjects it to a reg-
ulatory treatment more in line with internal subsidies, including 
traditional cost-of-service ratemaking principles. 
However, FERC continues to monitor whether the terms of 
access and pricing are just and reasonable, struggling mightily 
to give nondiscrimination any real meaning. A recent high-pro-
file legal challenge before the D.C. Circuit to FERC’s approval of 
a transmission arrangement that treats intermittent resources 
(such as wind) less favorably than nuclear power, hydro, and fos-
sil fuel sources of power generation in energycapacity markets 
illustrates this struggle and its significance for low-carbon 
sources of energy.93 Due in large part to regulatory ambivalence 
surrounding access and pricing of transmission, grid bottlenecks 
have grown and transmission lags in terms of new investment.94 
This kind of potential for discrimination in energy market access 
poses a particular threat to grid reliability, especially as the 
sources of energy supplying power to the grid become more nu-
merous and diverse.95 FERC possesses the authority to incentiv-
ize transmission-grid expansion to accommodate new sources of 
 
 91. See Hammond & Spence supra note 16, at 169–73 (discussing the move 
towards competitive power supply markets and the impacts of allowing the mar-
ket to take control). 
 92. See Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs., 75 FERC ¶ 31,036, 18 
C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385 (1995), aff ’d, New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002); see also 
supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Suzanne Herel, Clean Energy Advocates Appeal FERC’s Capacity 
Performance Rulings, RTO INSIDER (July 12, 2016), https://www.rtoinsider.com/ 
enviros-ferc-pjm-capacity-performance-28701. The D.C. Circuit rejected the 
challenges to FERC’s approval of a regional approach that required participants 
in capacity markets to commit to providing energy on an annual basis, which 
challengers alleged as discriminating against wind and solar resources. Ad-
vanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. FERC, 860 F.3d. 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 94. See Kennedy Maize, FERC and Its Transmission Candy Jar, ELECTRIC-
ITY POL’Y (2011), http://www.electricitypolicy.com/Maize-FERC%20Candy-6-6 
-11-final.pdf; Robert Walton, As Operators Update Grid Planning for Renewa-
bles, Transmission Remains Key Constraint, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 18, 2017), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/as-operators-update-grid-planning-for 
-renewables-transmission-remains-key/505065. 
 95. See Maize, supra note 94. 
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power supply, including wind, but its regulatory initiatives to 
date fall short.96 Exacerbating the problem further still, the ap-
proval of new transmission lines frequently faces state opposi-
tion, limiting the expansion of new transmission facilities to ac-
commodate low-carbon energy sources such as wind and large-
scale solar.97 
A final public good challenge presented by competitive en-
ergy markets is the lack of any national policy to price the carbon 
attributes of energy resources in private transactions. With the 
exception of hydropower facilities and nuclear plants, under fed-
eral law states retain primary jurisdiction over decisions related 
to the siting and approval of new power-generation facilities.98 
Yet, most states make no serious effort to regulate carbon emis-
sions at the existing sources of power generation. A few states, 
including most prominently California, have pursued ambitious 
efforts of their own to regulate carbon emissions from power-sup-
ply resources.99 However, with competitive interstate power 
markets, initiatives such as California’s cap-and-trade program 
may also produce negative spillover costs for neighboring juris-
dictions.100 This occurs when one state’s stringent pollution-con-
trol policies cause the demand for dirty power resources to shift 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a 
Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State 
and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 744–48 (2010) (identify-
ing how the connection between state siting decisions and ratemaking may dis-
courage transmission grid expansion, given FERC’s lack of siting authority); 
Alexandra Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review 
for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 140–54 (2015) (noting how 
states present a holdout barrier to expansion of energy infrastructure, including 
transmission lines). See generally Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Transmission 
Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009) (noting that the failure to ex-
pand the transmission grid is a function of the lack of FERC’s authority to 
preempt states, but that the pricing of transmission also needs to be addressed). 
 98. See Lawrence R. Greenfield, Associate General Counsel, Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, An Overview of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion and Federal Regulation in Public Utilities in the United States 10, 12 (De-
cember 2010), https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does/ferc101.pdf (providing what 
is and what is not within FERC’s statutory authority); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824a 
(2012). 
 99. See, e.g., Jim Rossi & Andrew J.D. Smith, Electric Power “Resource 
Shuffling” and Subnational Carbon Regulation: Looking Upstream for a Solu-
tion, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 43, 47–52 (2013–2014). 
 100. See, e.g., id. 
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to neighboring states—a form of carbon leakage known as re-
source shuffling.101 These kinds of problems can undermine 
state initiatives, absent some kind of border adjustment for en-
ergy imports and exports or a national effort to coordinate the 
carbon attributes of energy in market transactions. Further-
more, a recent Supreme Court decision has called into question 
whether internal subsidies adopted by states to promote goals 
such as grid reliability and carbon reduction can coexist at all 
with interstate energy markets—a topic discussed further be-
low.102 
D. THE SOLUTION OF A CARBON TAX 
A national carbon tax provides a simple, straightforward so-
lution to these problems. All proponents of such a tax see its core 
benefit as placing a value on important public goods, such as the 
carbon attributes of various energy resources. A carbon tax in-
ternalizes externalities associated with the production or con-
sumption of energy that markets currently do not price. Pricing 
carbon in such a tax would better: (1) incentivize investments in 
energy-transportation infrastructure such as transmission; (2) 
promote more reasonable access and pricing for non-incumbent 
energy resources; and (3) enhance reliability as a more diverse 
range of low-carbon resources are integrated into the grid. Car-
bon proposals differ in their details, but most are premised on 
similar core principles that are relatively uncontroversial: re-
source neutrality in accounting for externalities, efficient cost 
spreading through broad-based application, ensuring fairness 
and equity in application, and avoiding domestic jurisdictional 
problems with a single national approach that would be priced 
into interstate energy transactions. 
Neutrality is the first principle that informs carbon tax de-
sign.103 For any tax to internalize the social cost of carbon, poli-
cymakers must approach energy resources neutrally in address-
ing their future carbon impacts and apply the same tax 
 
 101. For example, early implementation of California’s cap-and-trade initia-
tive has led utilities to shuffle their carbon emissions out of state, as utilities 
replace contracts to purchase energy from dirty power plants with cleaner re-
sources, encouraging out-of-state utilities to then purchase the high-carbon en-
ergy for sales to customers. See, e.g., id. 
 102. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016). I 
return to discussion of this legal barrier to internal subsidies. Infra Part III.B.2. 
 103. See CASSADY ET AL., supra note 2, at 2; Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 
6, at 514–15. 
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treatment to both incumbents and new-entrant energy re-
sources. By providing an opportunity to revisit the tax treatment 
of energy resources, it would address much of the lack of parity 
in current tax treatment of energy-production resources. Neu-
trality in tax treatment could also help overcome the carbon lock-
in created by legacy fossil fuel energy resources. 
A second principle is cost spreading. A carbon tax places a 
value on important public goods such as the carbon attributes of 
various energy resources that markets currently do not price. 
This can be achieved through an excise tax (borne directly by 
customers) or a production tax (coupled with international bor-
der adjustments104). Each approach raises its own set of admin-
istrative, efficiency, and fairness concerns, but whoever is as-
sessed an immediate tax, a significant portion of the costs of 
carbon reduction will ultimately be passed on to everyone who 
consumes energy—helping to spread the burden of any carbon-
reduction initiative. 
A third principle informing carbon tax design is the need for 
attention to equity and fairness. Discussions of a carbon tax can-
not avoid the fundamental question of discrimination between 
consumers of energy, as well as discrimination among suppliers. 
While policymakers may disagree about the details, notions of 
fairness and distribution justice inform design of a carbon tax—
along similar lines to the design of any tax-based approach to 
providing for public goods. 
A final principle that informs carbon tax design is jurisdic-
tional evenhandedness. A carbon tax addresses spillovers that 
are presented by a state-by-state approach to regulating carbon 
emissions, such as carbon-leakage problems. In addition, a car-
bon tax provides an elegant and simple way to account for the 
social costs of carbon in an interstate energy market, sidestep-
ping many current jurisdictional disagreements between federal 
and state regulations and minimizing any new energy-market 
distortions. At the same time, any domestic carbon tax requires 
some form of border adjustment to address carbon-leakage is-
sues related to international trade.105 
 
 104. For a discussion of border tax adjustments for excise tax, see Metcalf & 
Weisbach supra note 6, at 542–45. 
 105. See id. 
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III.  EXISTING INTERNAL SUBSIDIES FOR CARBON 
REDUCTION   
Even absent a carbon tax, energy regulators do not need to 
give up on the public good goal of carbon reduction or the princi-
ples it brings to bear on energy policy. Going forward, policymak-
ers need to strike a balance, being attentive to declining invest-
ments in fossil fuels as older generation resources are reassessed 
and (in many instances) replaced,106 yet simultaneously growing 
infrastructure investments to accommodate low-carbon re-
sources and electrification of transportation. 
The carbon lock-in associated with existing energy infra-
structure underscores the significant role that both tax and reg-
ulatory tools can have in shaping electric power-supply infra-
structure. Energy regulators already have many tools at their 
disposal to overcome carbon lock-in and promote carbon reduc-
tion in the energy sector.107 This Part surveys how many of these 
tools are already being leveraged by regulators to pursue the pol-
icy goal of carbon reduction through internal subsidies. Much 
like a carbon tax, internal subsidies can steer private firms and 
individuals towards investing in low-carbon energy-infrastruc-
ture investments. 
However, since these tools are more fragmented and decen-
tralized in their application, they fail to fully recognize the social 
cost of carbon for all energy resources. They also can introduce 
market distortions, given that energy today is no longer pro-
duced and consumed within the borders of each individual state 
but instead is traded in competitive interstate markets.108 Vari-
ous approaches to internal subsidies present inevitable policy 
tradeoffs and also fall considerably short of the efficiency and 
social-welfare benefits that a carbon tax could provide. Their cur-
rent use presents regulators an opportunity to advance efficiency 
and social welfare by coordinating these initiatives, both across 
energy resources and across jurisdictions, to ensure that best 
features of regulation do not bring out the worst incentives for 
energy suppliers. 
The principles for optimal design of a national carbon tax 
provide a benchmark against which we can gauge the efficacy of 
 
 106. For example, it is important that regulators carefully monitor the 
growth of bridge fuels, such as natural gas, to ensure they do not become a 
stranded cost on any regulatory transition. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 
62, at 648–49. 
 107. See, e.g., Rossi & Hutton, supra note 28, at 1295–1303. 
 108. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 16, at 151–53. 
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internal subsidies in promoting efficiency and public welfare, 
and in assessing the reforms to internal subsidies. Measured 
against this benchmark, there is considerable opportunity for in-
ternal subsidies to be expanded and reformed. A more concerted 
effort must be made to determine the most efficient way of as-
sessing the customer burden of low-carbon energy, to address 
basic fairness and equity issues related to the pricing of energy, 
and regulators also need to be attentive to and proactive in ad-
dressing various jurisdictional spillovers.109 Based on the exam-
ples below, in Part IV I identify some principles to help regula-
tors in approaching internal subsidies in the transition to a low-
carbon energy system.110 
A. THE SUBSIDY IMPLICATIONS OF LOW-CARBON ENERGY 
MANDATES 
Regulatory mandates exist in many places in energy law. 
Yet scant attention is given to how a mandate also can promote 
and reinforce internal subsidies in the pricing of energy re-
sources. As this Section argues, these mandates can serve to jus-
tify and reinforce subsidies in customer rates. 
A regulatory mandate seeks to achieve a specific outcome or 
goal, subjecting noncompliance to a consequence. Often this 
takes the form of a penalty designed to deter harmful conduct or 
to disgorge benefits from a wrongdoer. Without regulation of 
prices, as in a competitive market (such as bulk power genera-
tion today), a firm paying this penalty gets to choose whether to 
pass this on to customer or take the loss from its own profits (and 
thus pass it on to investors). In a competitive market most firms 
would choose to have customers bear these costs, unless the non-
compliance penalty they face is firm-specific and is not some-
thing that competing firms are also forced to bear. But to the 
extent that a mandate requires a firm to make new investment 
choices that it would not otherwise select, these mandates must 
 
 109. Similar problems are identified in Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 6, at 
541–51. These authors come at a carbon tax through the lens of efficient insti-
tutional design, based on the principles of sound tax policy. See generally 
Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 6. While they highlight how these problems 
need to be addressed in the designing of carbon tax, they make no effort to ad-
dress how these problems are also rampant in the present approach to energy 
regulation, including in many internal subsidies designed to promote low-car-
bon energy resources. See infra Part IV.B. 
 110. See infra Part IV.B. 
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be subsidized by someone, though the firm in a competitive mar-
ket chooses itself whether to allocate the cost among investors or 
customers. 
Where mandates apply to a regulated firm (such as an elec-
tric-power distribution utility), taxation by regulation (that is, 
by internal subsidy) presents at least one advantage over a car-
bon tax: specifically, it gives regulators an opportunity to better 
align a mandate’s goals with its burdens by targeting the specific 
conduct that produces harm. An internal subsidy does not leave 
the choice of who pays for a mandate to the firm, allowing regu-
lators to impose the costs of penalties on those who are most 
likely to respond to them, more precisely managing the level of 
harm-producing activities. By contrast, where a mandate is not 
addressing a harm produced by a single firm, but instead is pro-
moting the creation of some public good in the future, an internal 
subsidy allows regulators a mechanism for passing it through in 
customer rates, much like an excise tax.111 A firm with regulated 
rates facing a mandate designed to encourage new technological 
investments will typically subsidize compliance costs through in-
ternal subsidies in rates—which will also present regulators (not 
the firm) the opportunity to decide how to allocate this internal 
subsidy among customers and to revisit these decisions over 
time. In approaching new mandates, regulators often need to be 
attentive to how this mandate is paid for: will it automatically 
be passed on to customers, how broadly, and who will bear the 
burden of it?112 
Although the federal government’s regulation of the carbon 
emissions from existing plants has been recently repealed,113 
current federal and state policies rely on a broad range of regu-
latory mandates to advance the public good of carbon-reduction. 
For example, existing Clean Air Act emissions requirements pro-
 
 111. To the extent that a carbon tax envisions that pollution control and 
other low-carbon energy mandates will continue to exist, it makes no effort to 
coordinate how these are paid for and by whom. Taxation by regulation, by con-
trast, gives regulators the opportunity to allocate the costs. 
 112. For a discussion of compliance costs and penalties, see J. HEETER ET 
AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., A SURVEY OF STATE-LEVEL COST AND 
BENEFIT ESTIMATES OF RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS, at v (May 2014), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/61042.pdf. 
 113. See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Tells Coal 
Miners He Will Repeal Power Plant Rule Tuesday: “The War Against Coal Is 
Over,” WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
energy-environment/wp/2017/10/09/pruitt-tells-coal-miners-he-will-repeal 
-power-plan-rule-tuesday-the-war-on-coal-is-over. 
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duce carbon reductions, either through direct regulation of emis-
sions for new power plants or through the regulation of co-pollu-
tants such as mercury.114 Apart from emissions mandates, com-
mon examples of mandates aimed at electricity production 
include state RPS standards, zero-emissions vehicle (ZEV) man-
dates that promote electrification of transportation, and energy 
efficiency mandates aimed at reducing electricity consumption. 
Unfortunately, in adopting these mandates, regulators have 
largely ignored their internal subsidy implications, paying little 
or no attention to whether they will be paid for by customers and 
whether the burden in rates will be shared broadly. As these 
mandates are scaled up to approach one hundred percent renew-
able energy, cost-allocation issues will also need to be addressed. 
1. State RPS Mandates 
An RPS is a regulatory mandate to increase production of 
energy from renewable sources, such as wind, solar, biomass and 
other alternatives to fossil fuel and nuclear generation.115 As of 
March 2015, twenty-nine states and Washington, D.C. have 
adopted mandatory RPS requirements.116 These standards con-
sistently allow compliance by establishing that a percentage of 
energy sold comes from wind and solar.117 States differ some-
what in the definition of which additional technologies meet an 
RPS, and many states have designed these standards to promote 
specific technologies or resources by including carve-out provi-
sions that mandate a certain percentage of electricity generated 
come from a specific source, such as solar or biomass.118 If a util-
ity is unable to directly produce or purchase renewable energy to 
comply with an RPS, most states allow utilities to purchase re-
newable energy credits to comply with the standard.119 
State RPS mandates have proved to be effective mandates 
for encouraging development of renewable energy, in large part 
 
 114. See 42 U.S.C. § 7402(g) (2012). 
 115. See HEETER ET AL., supra note 112, at 1–2. 
 116. EPA, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT GUIDE TO ACTION 5-1 (2015), https:// 
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/guide_action_full.pdf. 
An additional eight states have adopted non-binding RPS goals. Id.; see also 
Summary Tables, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/tables 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (providing additional data on state RPS standards). 
 117. EPA, supra note 116. 
 118. See generally HEETER ET AL., supra note 112, at 79–97 (discussing var-
ious state carve-out provisions). 
 119. See id. 
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because they allow utilities flexibility in how they choose to com-
ply with renewable power targets.120 They have worked to en-
courage renewable energy across different state regulatory envi-
ronments, including traditional cost or service regulation, as 
well as states that have moved towards competitive retail energy 
markets.121 The RPS targets provide stability for renewable-pro-
ject investors, and typically ramp up steadily over time to en-
courage greater investment in renewable projects.122 States, 
such as Texas and Iowa, have been leaders in promoting wind 
energy have RPS requirements, and it is estimated that state 
RPS policies have driven sixty to eighty percent of all U.S. solar 
photovoltaic installations.123 
State RPSs are often criticized as imposing a cost for elec-
tricity customers. In terms of average energy prices, however, 
RPS requirements have only a minimal impact on customer 
rates—perhaps because utilities subject to RPS requirements 
typically allocate compliance costs among all of the customers 
within the requirement’s jurisdiction.124 RPS requirements also 
produce significant benefits in many states, by reducing the costs 
of production for new renewable-power projects.125 Another crit-
icism is that state-by-state RPS approaches are not always con-
sistent in their standards and enforcement, which can create an 
unpredictable situation for investors in power resources that are 
aiming to trade energy in interstate commerce and result in car-
bon leakage.126 Although, as discussed below in Part IV, some 
federal renewable energy goals have been proposed in legisla-
tion, to date the federal government has failed to adopt any na-
tional renewable energy requirement.127 Problems remain, how-
ever, because states have limited ability to spread the costs of 
RPSs among out-of-state customers who benefit from them and 
 
 120. EPA, supra note 116, at 5-11. 
 121. See id. at 5-15. 
 122. See id. at 5-19. 
 123. Id. at 5-1 to -2. 
 124. Compliance costs are estimated to constitute less than two percent of 
average retail rates in most states with RPS mandates. See J. HEETER ET AL., 
supra note 112, at v. 
 125. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a Na-
tional RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1359–60 (2010); Joshua P. Fershee, Moving 
Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy Based on a National 
RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 1413–14 (2010). 
 126. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 125, at 1368–70 (arguing in favor of a na-
tional RPS); Fershee, supra note 125, at 1414 (arguing the same). 
 127. See infra Part IV.D. 
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there is potential for carbon leakage across jurisdictions, given 
interstate markets in electric power. 
2. Energy Efficiency Mandates 
The federal government has adopted a variety of industry 
mandates related to lighting and appliance standards, such as 
HVAC efficiency requirements. Additionally, many states have 
adopted building codes for new construction aimed at reducing 
electricity consumption. While economists tend to prefer cost in-
ternalization that reinforces price signals (such as a carbon tax) 
over mandates,128 there is little doubt that these requirements 
have played a significant role in steering consumer and invest-
ment decisions towards less-energy-intensive technologies. For 
example, mandates have reduced the demand for electricity by 
requiring adoption of specific lighting or appliance technologies, 
or requiring investment in energy-efficient buildings. 
As many as twenty-three states set broader state energy ef-
ficiency resource standards (EERSs), mandating that utilities 
meet specific efficiency targets.129 For example, Michigan’s 2008 
Clean, Renewable and Efficiency Energy Act130 specifies effi-
ciency targets (namely, a one percent annual reduction in power 
sales) and requires utilities to meet them.131 The Arizona, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont EERSs re-
quire an almost 2.5% annual savings.132 California has made 
specific efforts to tie energy-efficiency improvements to carbon 
and other GHG emissions in recent legislation133 that targets a 
 
 128. Ted Gayer & Alexander K. Gold, Four Reasons To Be Wary of Energy-
Efficiency Mandates, BROOKINGS (May 1, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
blog/planetpolicy/2015/05/01/four-reasons-to-be-wary-of-energy-efficiency 
-mandates. 
 129. D. STEINBERG & O. ZINAMAN, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., STATE 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS: DESIGN, STATUS, & IMPACTS 3 
(2014), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/61023.pdf. 
 130. S.B. 213, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008) (current version at MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 460.1001 (2017)). 
 131. David Eggert, Energy Efficiency in Michigan: What You Need To Know, 
LANSING ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/ 
local/2015/11/23/energy-efficiency-michigan-need-know/76170664. 
 132. AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., STATE ENERGY EFFI-
CIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS (EERS) 2–6 (2017), http://aceee.org/sites/ 
default/files/state-eers-0117.pdf (listing the details for each state’s energy effi-
ciency standard). 
 133. S.B. 350, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (current version at CAL. PUB. 
UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (West 2016)). 
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thirty percent reduction in electricity needs by 2030.134 These 
EERSs are expected to yield an average reduction in electricity 
consumption of as much as ten percent by 2020.135 
Much like RPSs, EERS requirements leave utilities flexibil-
ity in how they meet targets and allow customers to share in the 
responsibility for efficiency improvements.136 However, also like 
RPS requirements, states differ in their definitions of what 
counts as efficiency, with some focused on reducing total energy 
consumption or energy sales and others focused on reducing 
peak energy.137 To better match the goals of deep decarboniza-
tion, energy-efficiency requirements need to recognize how shifts 
in energy use associated with vehicle electrification will necessi-
tate some growth in the demand for electric power. These effi-
ciency requirements must thus look at the energy system as a 
whole (not just electric power) and must also focus on how reduc-
ing peak demand can produce decarbonization benefits (even if 
total consumption increases).138 
An additional form of state mandate regarding energy effi-
ciency is “decoupling,” requirements directed at retail utilities 
subject to cost-of-service ratemaking.139 Under the traditional 
approach to ratemaking, a utility’s revenues increase along with 
customer energy use: the more energy customers use, the more 
revenue a utility collects and the better its financial perfor-
mance.140 Several states require utilities to decouple their reve-
nue requirements from customer energy use in cost-of-service 
ratemaking, focusing on some policy objective over increased 
 
 134. Merrian Borgeson, California Legislature Doubles Down on Energy Ef-
ficiency, NAT. RESOURCE DEF. COUNCIL: EXPERT BLOG (Sept. 11, 2015), https:// 
www.nrdc.org/experts/merrian-borgeson/california-legislature-doubles-down 
-energy-efficiency. 
 135. STEINBERG & ZINAMAN, supra note 129, at 25. 
 136. See id. at 15. 
 137. See KAREN PALMER ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, PUTTING A FLOOR ON 
ENERGY SAVINGS: COMPARING STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STAND-
ARDS 4 (2012), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF 
-DP-12-11.pdf. 
 138. See generally Daniel L. Summerbell et al., Cost and Carbon Reductions 
from Industrial Demand-Side Management: Study of Potential Savings at a Ce-
ment Plant, 197 APPLIED ENERGY 100 (2017) (discussing how a cement plant’s 
shift of energy use to non-peak periods reduced carbon emissions). 
 139. See Utility Rate Decoupling, ALL. TO SAVE ENERGY (Oct. 24, 2013), 
https://www.ase.org/resources/utility-rate-decoupling-0. 
 140. Id. 
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sales of energy to customers.141 A rate design that decouples rev-
enues from sales encourages utilities to give customers price sig-
nals to discourage energy use, such as time-of-day pricing or in-
creasing energy rates for greater consumption, or refunds for 
using less energy.142 An advantage of these approaches is that 
they directly encourage a reduction in the peak demand for en-
ergy, reducing need for new power supply capacity additions.143 
Decoupling approaches vary substantially among states; several 
state regulators have mandated decoupling,144 but most states 
(along with the federal government) continue to encourage it on 
a voluntary basis, or simply allow utilities to use it as one way of 
meeting an EERS requirement.145 
3. ZEV Mandates 
Federal emissions mandates encourage automobile manu-
facturers to adopt low-emission technologies for fleets of vehi-
cles, including the development of electric vehicles.146 Federal 
law does not mandate ZEVs, and allows manufacturers flexibil-
 
 141. See CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., REVENUE DECOUPLING—AN 
OVERVIEW 2, https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/revenue-decoupling-detail.pdf. 
 142. See generally BRENDON BAATZ, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFI-
CIENT ECON., RATE DESIGN MATTERS: THE INTERSECTION OF RESIDENTIAL 
RATE DESIGN AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY (2017), http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/03/u1703.pdf (comparing different rate designs’ abili-
ties to influence consumer behavior). 
 143. See id. at 8–10 (describing different rate designs’ effects on peak energy 
consumption). 
 144. See CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., supra note 141, at 4 (noting 
that California, Massachusetts, and Connecticut all require utilities to have 
some form of decoupling program in their next rate case, while several other 
states have approved voluntary decoupling programs). 
 145. See Utility Rate Decoupling, supra note 139. The American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 conditioned receipt of more than three billion 
dollars in Energy Efficiency Program funds on the states’ creation of policies to 
align utility incentives with efficiency goals. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(codified in relevant part at 26 U.S.C. § 54D (2012)). 
 146. Both EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Association 
(NHTSA) have adopted credit multipliers that allow manufacturers to carry 
greenhouse gas credits forward by up to five years. Averaging, Banking, and 
Trading (ABT) Credit Program, 49 C.F.R. § 535.7 (2017). While the Clean Air 
Act authorizes EPA to adopt credit multipliers to encourage new technologies 
such as vehicle electrification based on tailpipe emissions, 42 U.S.C. § 7404 
(2012), to date it appears that NHTSA does not believe that it has such author-
ity given the CAFE program’s focus on fuel use. Corporate Average Fuel Econ-
omy, NHTSA (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/laws-regulations/ 
corporate-average-fuel-economy. Consequently, NHTSA’s credits are limited to 
alternative fuel vehicles and do not include electric vehicles. Id. 
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ity to adopt different technological approaches for transporta-
tion.147 But section 209 of the Clean Air Act gives California 
unique authority to issue stricter vehicle-emissions require-
ments than the federal standard, and also allows other states to 
adopt the more stringent standard based on California’s require-
ments.148 California’s ZEV program requires automobile compa-
nies to produce a certain percentage of zero-emissions vehicles 
for sale in California, such as hydrogen fuel cell, battery electric, 
and hybrid vehicles.149 Under this standard, by the 2025 model 
year automakers that sell vehicles in California must meet a six-
teen percent ZEV requirement.150 Nine other states have an-
nounced that they will follow California’s lead and adopt ZEV 
standards of their own.151 These ZEV mandates could prove im-
portant to facilitating electrification of the vehicle fleet. At the 
same time, they could have unintended consequences.152 Specif-
ically, they do not address how additional electric power supply 
will be provided, including whether it will come from fossil fuel 
or low-carbon sources of energy.153 Nor do they address the im-
portant internal subsidy issue of who will pay for it.154 
B. SUBSIDIES FOR LOW-CARBON ENERGY RESOURCES 
In contrast to mandates, electric-power subsidies reflect di-
rect or indirect transfers to private firms to promote particular 
forms of investment in low-carbon energy resources.155 Much 
like longstanding federal programs that benefit legacy fossil fuel 
 
 147. See generally Key Federal Legislation, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY: ALT. 
FUELS DATA CTR., https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/key_legislation (last visited Oct. 
18, 2017) (summarizing federal laws related to alternative fuels, air quality, fuel 
efficiency, and other transportation issues). 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2012). 
 149. See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1962.2 (2015) (describing 
standards for 2018 and beyond). 
 150. See ZEV Programs, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS. (last updated 
2013), http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-maps/zev-program. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See JULIAN MORRIS & ARTHUR R. WARDLE, REASON FOUND., CAFE AND 
ZEV STANDARDS: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS AND ALTERNATIVES 8–9 (2017), 
http://www.reason.org/files/cafe_zev_standards_environment_alternatives.pdf. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See generally Roberts, supra note 36 (providing a general summary of 
federal programs). 
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resources,156 these subsidies often take the form of taxation ra-
ther than regulation.157 Such subsidies often draw on the na-
tion’s general tax base, as with income tax credits, to encourage 
investment in particular clean-energy technologies such as wind 
power.158 
In line with Posner’s notion of taxation by regulation, both 
federal and state regulators increasingly also rely on internal 
subsidies to promote low-carbon energy resources. Internal sub-
sides are typically built into regulated customer rates, which 
pass through the costs of carbon reduction to consumers outside 
of the public tax system. Though below-the-radar in comparison 
to tax incentives, internal subsidies are deeply embedded in en-
ergy regulation and have played an important role in helping to 
encourage the adoption of new energy capital projects with high 
front-end fixed costs, such as investments in nuclear power. 
With increased attention to clean energy in the past decade, they 
have spread and grown in significance in the setting of customer 
rates—though they also leave many important efficiency and so-
cial-welfare issues unaddressed. 
1. Low-Carbon Subsidies Through General Taxation 
Similar to longstanding tax subsidies that favor legacy fossil 
fuel energy resources, many existing tax subsidies also aim to 
encourage investment in low-carbon energy projects.159 Perhaps 
the most substantial existing tax subsidies are federal tax cred-
its for solar and wind projects.160 The thirty percent investment 
tax credit used for many solar projects and some wind projects 
was adopted in 2006 and, following a 2016 extension, is presently 
set to expire in 2022.161 The production tax credit for wind pro-
jects was adopted in 1992 and has been subject to expiration 
every few years, creating great uncertainty among wind inves-
tors (and leading to significant declines in investments in new 
 
 156. See supra Part II.A. 
 157. See Roberts, supra note 36, at 73–74. 
 158. See Total Energy Subsidies Decline, supra note 38. 
 159. See, e.g., HARRISON FELL ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, DESIGNING RE-
NEWABLE ELECTRICITY POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS 8–9 (2012), http://www 
.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-12-54.pdf (describing 
how the Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit influenced wind energy de-
velopment). 
 160. TRIEU MAI ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., IMPACTS OF FED-
ERAL TAX CREDIT EXTENSIONS ON RENEWABLE DEPLOYMENT AND POWER SEC-
TOR EMISSIONS 1 (2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/65571.pdf. 
 161. See id. at 1–2. 
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projects).162 As of 2015, it has been renewed until 2020—though 
in 2017 the credits will be declining in value by twenty percent 
per year.163 These tax credits are available nationwide and fi-
nanced through the general tax base.164 They have significantly 
impacted wind and solar project development.165 But they also 
have been criticized for promoting energy consumption and fail-
ing to provide incentives for new projects based on the environ-
mental qualities of new power projects, which vary geograph-
ically in price and the degree to which they displace fossil fuel 
energy resources.166 
State and local governments also offer tax incentives for re-
newable energy projects, paid for by citizens in their taxes.167 
Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programs provide a 
good example.168 These programs allow property owners to vol-
untarily opt to participate in a government program, qualifying 
for a loan to cover the large up-front costs associated with energy 
efficiency improvements or solar panels and repay these costs 
over a ten-to-twenty-year period through property assess-
ments.169 The costs can sometimes be covered through property 
taxes, but many local governments finance these programs 
through special assessment districts that issue bonds to cover 
the costs.170 While such programs could be very promising, fed-
eral restrictions on home loans have hobbled state and local gov-
ernments’ ability to expand residential PACE incentives.171 
 
 162. See id. at 1. 
 163. Id. at 2. 
 164. See, e.g., FELL ET AL., supra note 159, at 4 (depicting different renewa-
ble energy production levels for renewable energy programs across various re-
gions of the United States). 
 165. MAI ET AL., supra note 160, at 1. 
 166. See FELL ET AL., supra note 159, at 2. 
 167. See, e.g., DEP’T OF ENERGY, BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR RESIDEN-
TIAL PACE FINANCING PROGRAMS (2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/ 
files/2016/11/f34/best-practice-guidelines-RPACE.pdf (detailing one such pro-
gram). 
 168. See id. at 1. 
 169. See id. At 4–5; see also What Is PACE?, PACE NATION, http://www 
.pacenation.us/what-is-pace (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (providing basic infor-
mation on PACE programs, such as general length of repayment). 
 170. See Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Property Assessed 
Clean Energy Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://energy.gov/eere/slsc/ 
property-assessed-clean-energy-programs. 
 171. See id. (noting how recent Federal Housing Financing Agency guide-
lines have led to suspension of many PACE programs for residential property 
owners). 
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2. Ratepayer Subsidies for Low-Carbon Power Projects 
Over the history of the electric power industry, internal sub-
sidies paid by ratepayers have proved essential to financing im-
portant infrastructure projects with high front-end fixed costs, 
such as the tens of thousands of miles of new transmission lines 
built for rural customers in the years following the New Deal.172 
While customer subsidies can lead to controversial and ineffi-
cient investment choices, as with investments in nuclear power 
during the 1960s and 1970s,173 they also provide utilities a way 
of using customer rates to help reduce financing costs and uncer-
tainty for expensive new infrastructure projects, without resort-
ing to governmental taxation. 
Capital-intensive infrastructure projects, including most 
low-carbon sources of power supply, similarly face high front-end 
fixed costs. It is difficult for private markets to raise sufficient 
capital to finance these projects, especially where there is finan-
cial, technological and regulatory uncertainty.174 In approaching 
decarbonization of the grid, ratepayer subsidies can serve as a 
form of taxation to help finance new sources of power supply and 
transmission infrastructure. However, unless approached care-
fully, existing approaches to these subsidies also might hinder 
efficient and fair efforts to promote low-carbon infrastructure in-
vestments.175 Two significant problems that these subsidies pre-
sent are technology lock-in and jurisdictional spillovers. 
a. Technology Lock-In Problems 
In the context of nuclear power plants, state regulators have 
responded to concerns with high fixed costs by allowing utilities 
to receive accelerated cost recovery from customers for invest-
ments in new projects.176 Especially as new technologies such as 
modular nuclear become commercially viable, these types of fi-
 
 172. See Linda A. Cameron, Power to the Farmer: Minnesota and the Rural 
Electrification Act, MINNPOST (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.minnpost.com/ 
mnopedia/2017/02/power-farmer-minnesota-and-rural-electrification 
-administration. 
 173. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 504–05. 
 174. See, e.g., id. at 505 (describing problems caused by investment in nu-
clear plants despite numerous uncertainties). 
 175. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 36, at 112–13 (noting how the current Pro-
duction Tax Credit program has raised issues in wind energy development). 
 176. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 508–09. 
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nancing mechanisms could prove important to private invest-
ment decisions.177 Such financing mechanisms could also prove 
essential to other costly clean-energy infrastructure decisions, 
such as carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), new multistate 
transmission lines for renewable power supply, and utility-scale 
solar facilities.178 Regulators are often allowed to spread the 
costs of new projects broadly among customers, usually through 
fixed rate charges (also known as demand charges).179 Signifi-
cantly, such strategies are subject to customer backlash and not 
always successful. For example, Mississippi’s Supreme Court re-
jected front-end retail customer cost recovery to support South-
ern Company’s significant capital investment in a CCS facility 
(through its subsidiary Mississippi Power), leaving cost recovery 
to ordinary prudence review of customer rates and creating sub-
stantial uncertainty surrounding the investment climate for this 
important new technology.180 
Another widely used approach to addressing earlier-genera-
tion environmental compliance is a rate adder, or a surcharge 
fee on customer rates, that is allocated to pay for the costs of 
complying with state or federal environmental standards.181 
These have been used for decades in many states.182 Most adders 
target particular pollution-abatement technologies that are nec-
 
 177. See, e.g., Mark Cooper, Small Modular Reactors and the Future of Nu-
clear Power in the United States, 3 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 161, 172–73 (2014) 
(describing how the high cost of new nuclear technology can make implementa-
tion unfeasible). 
 178. See, e.g., The United States CCS Financing Overview, MIT, http:// 
sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/us_ccs_background.html (last updated 
Sept. 30, 2016) (noting the massive start-up costs for different CCS projects). 
 179. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 514. 
 180. See Darren Samuelsohn, Billions over Budget. Two Years After Dead-
line. What’s Gone Wrong for the “Clean Coal” Project That’s Supposed To Save 
an Industry?, POLITICO (May 26, 2015), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/ 
2015/05/billion-dollar-kemper-clean-coal-energy-project-000015 (noting how 
the original price tag of the Kemper CCS project swelled from $1.8 to $6.2 bil-
lion); Ian Urbina, Piles of Dirty Secrets Behind a Model “Clean Coal” Project, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/science/kemper 
-coal-mississippi.html (describing cost overruns and other problems with the 
Kemper project). 
 181. Catherine M.H. Keske et al., Total Cost Electricity Pricing: A Market 
Solution for Increasingly Rigorous Environmental Standards, 25 ELECTRICITY 
J. 7, 8–9 (2012). 
 182. Id. (noting that by the mid-1990s more than half the states had adopted 
or were considering environmental adders). 
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essary to comply with environmental mandates—basically com-
pensating the firm for compliance with a particular standard.183 
They have been criticized, however, insofar as they invite energy 
regulators to add new environmental requirements that may be 
at odds with environmental standards.184 
These kinds of ratepayer subsidies for new power projects 
often require regulators to pick winners and losers, locking in 
decades of financial commitments for specific projects and tech-
nologies.185 Over time, however, technologies evolve and project 
cost estimates can significantly increase, creating a significant 
revenue shortfall not automatically corrected through adoption 
of a new budget.186 An environmental adder that compensates a 
firm for meeting a particular pollution control standard, for ex-
ample, can lock-in an abatement technology for decades, even 
though technology and regulatory standards continue to improve 
and decline in cost.187 This reduces the effectiveness of environ-
mental regulators showing any flexibility in compliance ap-
proaches, as flexibility may allow firms a revenue windfall.188 
For this reason, many economists have disfavored state regula-
tor use of environmental adders, instead favoring a mandate ap-
proach for pollution control that allows the firm to pass on pru-
dent compliance costs and to determine the optimal compliance 
strategy.189 
The technology lock-in problem with customer rate subsi-
dies is also illustrated by the now-notorious nuclear plant costs 
overruns of the 1970s and 1980s.190 As new, lower-cost power 
generation technological opportunities became more cost feasi-
ble, utilities aggressively sought ratepayer recover for stranded 
costs from plants that were not benefitting customers.191 This 
only reinforces perceptions that firms are owed something due 
 
 183. See id. at 11 (stating that utilities would rank different technologies to 
achieve the most competitive price, influenced by each technology’s added social 
cost). 
 184. Paul Joskow, Weighing Environmental Externalities: Let’s Do It Right!, 
5 ELECTRICITY J. 53, 57–58 (1992). 
 185. E.g., Roberts, supra note 36, at 107. 
 186. See Samuelsohn, supra note 180; Urbina, supra note 180. 
 187. Joskow, supra note 184, at 66–67. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id.; see also Stephen R. Connors, Externality Adders and Cost-Ef-
fective Emissions Reductions: Using Tradeoff Analysis To Promote Environmen-
tal Improvement and Risk Mitigation, 55 ECON., EFFICIENCY, & QUALITY: PROC. 
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 190. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 504–05.  
 191. Id. 
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to a regulator’s previous decisions, leading to regulatory bailouts 
that can be particularly burdensome for customers with no sub-
stitutes.192 
Similar challenges plague customer subsidies designed to 
pay for some high-cost low-carbon projects, such as Mississippi 
Power’s Kemper CCS facility.193 Mississippi regulators ap-
proved this project for cost recovery, allowing Mississippi Power 
to collect revenues in customer rates and build up significant ac-
counts for the Kemper CCS project.194 However, the Kemper 
CCS project was delayed and never became operational—ulti-
mately resulting in rate refunds.195 While such rate refunds pro-
tect current customers, they do little to move infrastructure for-
ward—essentially starting the regulatory and rate-approval 
clock all over again on any additional carbon reduction pro-
posals. 
Rather than treating these early cost recovery decisions as 
project-specific revenue streams for particular utilities, each 
needing its own approval and rate treatment, regulators might 
be able to adopt project funding tools that allow them to take 
advantage of the passage of time: for example, subjecting project 
approvals to ongoing prudence review that incorporates new in-
formation as more is learned about different technologies and 
project construction costs. In other words, based on an initial de-
termination of need for low-carbon infrastructure, regulators 
might approve the collection from customers of up-front costs for 
new projects, holding them in trust (as a form of insurance) in 
carbon infrastructure accounts; if for some reason a specific pro-
ject is later deemed imprudent by regulators (for example due to 
cost overruns or new technological developments), rather than 
ordering a rate refund (as occurred in the case of the Kemper 
CCS project196) these collected funds could be reallocated to 
other large-scale low-carbon infrastructure projects, which could 
be selected through some kind of competitive bidding process. 
Similarly, rather than representing payments to specific firms, 
carbon adders could be designed to fund new low-carbon infra-
structure projects. 
 
 192. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 62, at 680. 
 193. See Samuelsohn, supra note 180; Urbina, supra note 180. 
 194. See Samuelsohn, supra note 180; Urbina, supra note 180. 
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b. Jurisdictional Spillover Concerns 
Another problem with existing customer subsidy ap-
proaches relates to jurisdictional spillovers. One state’s custom-
ers may be paying for these adders while energy produced in that 
state may be traded in interstate markets, which can produce 
distortions in the supply and demand for power.197 
This problem is not without regulatory solution. The most 
obvious way to fix it would be to scale-up subsidies to a national 
level—a problem that a national carbon tax could readily solve. 
Even absent a national carbon tax, states adopting carbon ad-
ders could make adjustments to customer rates for energy im-
ported from power generators in other states, akin to the kinds 
of border adjustments used in taxation.198 Alternatively, a form 
of carbon adder could be adopted at the regional level, for exam-
ple, as a carbon adder for different sources of energy to the prices 
in RTO open-access transmission tariffs approved by FERC.199 
Such an approach could be used to produce a carbon infrastruc-
ture fund, distributing resources to new projects approved by 
states within the RTO’s footprint.200 
However, these kinds of approaches risk running into some 
legal obstacles under federal law. FERC’s “just and reasonable” 
rate requirement under the Federal Power Act (FPA)201 requires 
the agency to make an effort to find some shared benefits or 
quantify the project’s benefits, such as a multistate transmission 
to serve renewable sources of electric power, prior to regulatory 
approval of subsidies that spread the project’s costs among cus-
tomers.202 
In a 2009 decision written by Judge Posner, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that FERC is subject to 
a cost causation principle, which requires the agency to make 
some effort to quantify the benefits from allocating the costs of 
new transmission to wholesale customers before imposing those 
costs.203 In rejecting FERC’s approval of pro rata cost allocation 
 
 197. See, e.g., Joskow, supra note 184, at 59–60. 
 198. See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 6, at 541. 
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among utilities for a regional transmission line project, Judge 
Posner reasoned that “FERC is not authorized to approve a pric-
ing scheme that requires a group of utilities to pay for facilities 
from which its members derive no benefits, or benefits that are 
trivial in relation to the costs sought to be shifted to its mem-
bers.”204 This cost causation principle might be construed as a 
limitation on federal agency use of cross-customer subsidies to 
finance new transmission line projects, especially where a chal-
lenger can point to some evidence of disparate benefits across 
different customer classes.205 In reviewing the agency’s decision 
on remand, the Seventh Circuit again rejected a postage-stamp 
approach to allocating transmission costs for the same transmis-
sion line project where there was evidence that the line produced 
benefits for some customers or little or no benefits for other cus-
tomers, but no evidence that it produced shared benefits.206 
As Judge Richard Cudahy noted in a dissent, however, a 
failure to recognize regional sharing of costs across customer 
groups will present serious difficulties for new transmission line 
projects aimed at promoting reliability and new clean-energy re-
sources. In the past, he noted, state regulators approved these 
kinds of transmission projects, routinely spreading their costs 
among all of a utility’s retail customers.207 However, the Seventh 
Circuit’s cost causation standard is not as significant of a barrier 
as it might seem to the use of broad customer subsidies to finance 
low-carbon investments. Another decision by the Seventh Cir-
cuit (also written by Judge Posner) accepted a similar approach 
to cost allocation for new transmission lines for wind power 
across all members of an RTO where there was evidence that the 
lines would not yield highly disparate benefits and FERC had 
determined that the benefits from the new lines would be spread 
almost evenly across customers.208 Thus, while the Seventh Cir-
cuit has reminded FERC of the significance of evaluating subsi-
dies through the lens of the cost causation principle, this is not 
a wholesale rejection of efforts to broadly spread costs for pro-
jects that produce widespread benefits: as long as FERC either 
makes some findings related to or quantifies a project’s benefits, 
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FERC still can approve inter-customer subsidies in allocating 
the costs of transmission lines. In addition to focusing on relia-
bility benefits (as was at issue in these cases), FERC could 
strengthen its regulatory approach to using cross-customer sub-
sidies by making findings or an effort to quantify the carbon-re-
duction benefits of new transmission lines. 
Another legal obstacle to internal subsidies aimed at encour-
aging low-carbon energy is presented by the federalism scheme 
of the FPA. The Supreme Court recently held that federal ap-
proval of rates in the regulation of competitive wholesale power 
markets preempts state initiatives aimed at targeting wholesale 
energy rates by benefitting a specific power supplier.209 This le-
gal decision has important implications in those areas of the 
country where FERC regulates rates in organized wholesale 
power markets. Importantly, it does not appear to affect the abil-
ity of rate-regulated utilities to draw on retail customer subsi-
dies to support new infrastructure projects.210 In addition, as dis-
cussed below, the Supreme Court has correctly recognized the 
continued need for states to draw on a variety of subsidies to 
promote clean-energy power supply options.211 Even in areas of 
the United States where regional power markets thrive, many 
public goods (including decarbonization) are not presently priced 
in interstate electric markets.212 Therefore, state ratepayer sub-
sidies for new low-carbon energy infrastructure that directly tar-
get these public-good-related goals, rather than FERC-approved 
interstate wholesale power prices, should generally not run afoul 
of federal preemption.213 States should be well positioned to de-
fend these kinds of internal subsidies by participating in re-
gional initiatives, subject to FERC approval, or by adopting com-
petitive bidding processes for new low-carbon power projects 
that are not limited to in-state energy resources. 
3. Subsidies for Distributed Energy Resources 
Energy supply resources that are distributed on a smaller 
scale, such as commercial and residential rooftop solar, are often 
financed by utilities through customer or ratepayer subsidies. 
 
 209. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016). 
 210. Id. at 1299. 
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 212. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 16, at 212 (discussing the obstacles 
regions face when attempting to place value on social costs). 
 213. The need for FERC to clarify the preemption implications of this legal 
decision to encourage state subsidies for decarbonized power supply projects is 
discussed further, infra Part IV.A. 
 316 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:277 
 
One such incentive is net metering, or the requirement that a 
utility accept the surplus energy produced by customer distrib-
uted-solar photovoltaic facilities, typically in exchange for com-
pensating the customer with a per kWh billing credit.214 Net me-
tering programs are quite popular: they have been adopted in as 
many as forty-four states,215 and are typically financed through 
a utility’s general rate base in the rates that all customers pay 
for energy. As is discussed below,216 they have also proved con-
troversial. 
Several states have also adopted feed-in tariffs, or set pay-
ments for each kilowatt hour particular renewable power gener-
ation facilities sell back to the distribution grid. A typical feed-
in tariff program guarantees payments in dollars per kilowatt 
hour for a guaranteed period of time for a particular renewable-
power technology. FERC has determined that these programs 
must comply with the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(PURPA) requirement that utilities not be required to purchase 
customer generation at prices that exceed avoided costs, but 
states retain considerable flexibility to base payments on the 
value of renewable generation to the energy system and to soci-
ety, including environmental externalities and other attrib-
utes.217 One advantage of a feed-in tariff is that it gives a renew-
able power supplier a dependable, long-term revenue stream, 
which allows a project developer to obtain lower-cost financ-
ing.218 Feed-in tariff programs nicely track state authority over 
retail rates and have been particularly effective at promoting re-
newable-power development when they complement state RPS 
goals.219 At the same time, one concern with feed-in tariffs is that 
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they require regulators to pick technological winners and losers, 
a concern that could be addressed if tariff rates are set based on 
a competitive bidding process that recognized each resource’s 
value to energy system. 
C. ALLOCATING SUBSIDIES IN RETAIL CUSTOMER CHARGES 
Rate design is the process by which these internal subsidies 
are allocated among utility customers.220 Where public taxation 
does not pay for the costs of energy infrastructure investments, 
additional charges in retail customer bills are often necessary. 
Regulators’ approaches to setting customer charges have im-
portant implications for economic efficiency and consumer wel-
fare, because these charges can influence the quantity of energy 
consumed, as well as basic fairness among customers.221 Utili-
ties historically set retail customer bills with fixed (or demand) 
and variable (or energy) charge components. As utilities increas-
ingly pursue new low-carbon energy infrastructure, retail cus-
tomer bills are likely to see a significant increase in demand 
charges, as there is a need for high front-end project costs.222 If 
not approached carefully, this can have adverse consequences for 
both economic efficiency and consumer welfare. 
First, allocating significant costs to all retail customers 
based on a demand charge distorts pricing signals and promotes 
wasteful energy consumption. A problem with demand billing 
charges is that they do not accurately price energy based on the 
amount consumed: once the fixed-cost component of a bill is paid, 
a customer is incentivized to consume more units of energy, as 
this reduced the per-unit cost. It is thus important for regulators 
to set fixed charges for various customers, especially larger com-
mercial and residential customers, at higher levels, and to retain 
a significant variable cost charge in these customers’ bills. In-
dustrial and commercial customers whose usage of energy relies 
more heavily on fossil fuel resources, including peaking gas 
plants, must face signals that encourage them to adjust the 
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quantity of energy consumed to avoid waste and to promote the 
goals associated with other policies, such as decoupling. 
Second, if not approached with care, allocating the costs of 
mandates and subsidies through fixed customer charges can dis-
proportionately burden those customers who can afford it least, 
leading to regressive distributional impacts. As used in tax pol-
icy discussions, horizontal equity refers to the notion that simi-
lar individuals with similar incomes and assets should pay sim-
ilar tax rates.223 Energy law incorporates this notion of 
horizontal equity in the common principle (routinely embedded 
in statutory rate mandates224) that regulators setting rates must 
protect against rate discrimination by ensuring that similarly 
situated customers pay similar charges for the benefits they re-
ceive. As discussed above, for example, recent litigation sur-
rounding subsidies in the allocation of costs for new transmis-
sion lines has required FERC to ensure that customers who 
benefit in a similar manner are allocated similar costs.225 
In setting customer charges for a decarbonized grid, policy-
makers must also be attentive to how the agency’s nondiscrimi-
nation mandate extends to potential competition (not only exist-
ing customers or suppliers) and to substitutes for the 
consumption of electric power, such as conservation or customer 
self-generation. In tax policy, vertical equity evaluates how tax 
impacts vary across individuals with different wealth character-
istics, to assess the distributive consequences of different tax ap-
proaches.226 While often ignored in energy and environmental 
regulation contexts,227 attention to vertical equity in energy law 
would require an agency evaluating discrimination in setting 
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rates to assess how customers with different wealth characteris-
tics may bear a disproportionate share of costs. As an example, 
it is not uncommon in rate design for residential customers to be 
allocated the primary burden for peak capacity necessary to de-
liver firm (also known as uninterruptible) power to them, while 
industrial customers may only pay energy costs in what is known 
as interruptible rates. This results in a higher demand compo-
nent in residential, as opposed to industrial, rates, but per-
versely it can also result in a class of customers with less wealth 
paying for more of a utility’s fixed costs.228 In the rate design 
process, it is important for regulators to ensure that residential 
customers are not forced to pay excessively for components of the 
fixed charges associated with lower-carbon energy resources 
that benefit the energy system as a whole or that benefit other 
customer classes, including large commercial and industrial cus-
tomers. 
Decisions about the cost allocation for new projects should 
be open and transparent, and should allow for participation of a 
broad range of customer interests. To protect vertical equity con-
cerns, regulators should avoid approving the allocation of all 
costs for new energy infrastructure projects into fixed charges 
for customers. Similarly, even fixed surcharges for all customers 
for new projects should generally be avoided. One increasingly 
common example of a customer surcharge is an environmental 
adder, though fixed adder charges that apply to every customer’s 
bill are regressive and should be avoided.229 In contrast to ap-
proaching cost allocation for all new infrastructure in fixed 
charges or additional retail customer demand fees, a variable 
carbon adder (at levels that increase based on customer kWh en-
ergy usage) can allow cost recovery for new decarbonization in-
frastructure without encouraging wasteful consumption or im-
pairing customer fairness goals.230 Customers who use more 
energy would pay more under this approach, since it would im-
pose the greatest burden on those customers whose energy usage 
generates the most significant carbon pollution.231 Such an ap-
proach is consistent with traditional ratemaking principles inso-
far as (in symmetry with horizontal cost causation principles) it 
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ties the costs of various activities that require energy to the bur-
den that each customer imposes on the energy system and its 
related social goals, including decarbonization. In contrast to 
conventional utility rate design, this approach spreads the bur-
den of new programs more broadly among all customers in a 
manner that is proportionate to the burden each customer im-
poses on the system. 
As an illustration of how customer charges may have a dis-
proportionate adverse impact for the poorest customers, consider 
net metering—a policy authorized in more than forty states that 
allows residential customers installing solar arrays to receive a 
billing credit for each kilowatt hour of surplus solar power that 
is provided to the grid.232 Net metering is sometimes criticized 
as a regressive policy, insofar as it burdens all customers for fa-
cilities that only benefit investments made by middle-class or 
wealthier customers.233 Such concerns are probably overstated, 
especially to the extent that regulators have failed to explain the 
system-wide benefits that customer solar can produce for a resil-
ient energy grid. However, to the extent that some low-income 
customers cannot afford to participate in net metering programs, 
the regressivity concerns are not entirely unfounded. The regres-
sivity effect can be further exacerbated if net metering custom-
ers place a disproportionate burden on the grid and if low-income 
customers are forced to pay for this. Regulators might address 
these vertical equity concerns by waiving any fixed charge asso-
ciated with participating in net metering programs for low in-
come customers, shifting a portion of fixed charges to those cus-
tomers who are likely to benefit most from net metering. 
Alternatively, they might offer community solar or provide low-
income assistance or interest-free loans or property-tax credits 
to encourage customer energy resource deployment among low-
income customers. 
IV.  UNLEASHING INTERNAL SUBSIDIES FOR A LOW-
CARBON FUTURE   
Significant reforms to existing law and regulation will prove 
necessary to meet carbon reduction targets. Drawing in part on 
Posner’s important insight that regulation operates as a form of 
taxation, as gauged against basic principles of sound institu-
tional design of a carbon tax, addressing carbon reduction 
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through internal subsidies leaves many important efficiency and 
social welfare issues unaddressed.234 
Some basic policy guideposts can inform and clarify policy 
choices as they unleash the carbon tax potential of internal sub-
sidies. These guideposts will require regulators relying on inter-
nal subsidies for carbon reduction to identify the most efficient 
customer base for sharing the burden of important public goods, 
such as carbon reduction and grid reliability. They also will re-
quire regulators to be more attentive to both horizontal and ver-
tical equity in applying nondiscrimination principles in setting 
internal subsidies and the rules for energy markets. Too, regu-
lators must explicitly address spillover and regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities presented by the diversity of regulatory ap-
proaches. In short, to the extent regulators see internal subsidies 
as producing the same public goods as a carbon tax, they need to 
approach internal subsidies with same principles that would ap-
ply under a carbon tax. Whether or not a carbon tax is ultimately 
adopted, such an approach will better align regulatory goals with 
the promotion of efficiency and social welfare in the transition to 
a low-carbon grid. 
A. POLICY GUIDEPOSTS 
Existing approaches to internal subsidies provide several 
lessons and opportunities for improvement as regulators look to 
improve the provision of public goods in interstate energy mar-
kets, such as greater reliability and carbon reduction. However, 
the fragmented approach to internal subsidies among state reg-
ulators remains inconsistent and faces tension with modern en-
ergy markets. Going forward, policymakers can improve internal 
subsidies by looking to the core principles that inform design of 
a carbon tax: neutrality, cost spreading, fairness and equity, and 
evenhandedness.235 At the same time, the fragmented nature of 
internal subsidies will require regulators to confront some 
unique challenges. Five basic policy guideposts can assist energy 
regulators in better aligning internal subsidies with the princi-
ples that would inform the optimal design of a carbon tax: 
1. Resource and incumbent neutrality should be the pre-
sumptive starting point in imposing any internal subsidies. To 
the extent that mandates or requirements apply in different 
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manners across various energy resources (as do RPS require-
ments), they should be presumptively authorized for recovery 
through internal subsidies in customer rates, with an eye to-
wards maximizing the base of customers who will pay for them. 
2. To the extent that public goods (such as decarbonization 
goals) are not fully priced in energy markets, in approving new 
regulatory mandates and internal subsidies, both federal and 
state regulators should make findings of benefits include public 
good that they produce (such as carbon reduction). 
  a. Presumptively, internal subsidies to advance low-car-
 bon grid infrastructure should be spread as broadly as pos-
 sible among the ratepayers who benefit from them. 
  b. Neither the finding of benefits nor a proportionate as-
 sessment of their burdens needs to be limited to a particular 
 jurisdiction. 
 c. Regulators setting subsidies should be attentive to spill
 over costs, including carbon leakage problems, and should 
 make appropriate boarder adjustments or appeal to regional 
 or national regulators to address these concerns. 
3. Regulators should favor internal subsidies that allow for 
flexibility in energy resource investment decisions, rather than 
those that promote technological lock-in. For example, rate reg-
ulators should be encouraged to adopt pre-construction rate-
payer subsidies for new low-carbon investments with high front-
end fixed costs, while also retaining flexibility to reallocate these 
funds (rather than refund them to customers) if later develop-
ments deem a specific project imprudent. 
 4. While federal subsidies to produce public goods should 
not be disfavored, especially as a way of correcting for market 
distortions, federal regulators need to recognize a complemen-
tary role for states. 
 a. Federal regulators should encourage subnational exper-
 imentation with subsidies, treating any federal require-
 ments or internal subsidies as floors, and should not be al-
 lowed to crowd out more stringent state standards or inno-
 vations that advance the same public goods.236 
  b. Subnational internal subsidies should be considered 
 presumptively consistent with interstate energy markets 
 where they demonstrate benefits and make an effort to im-
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 pose burdens that are roughly commensurate with those 
 benefits. 
5. Customer cost allocation, including retail charges, should 
be set in a manner that is not only mindful to narrow notions of 
horizontal equity among energy suppliers, or merely treating 
like customers alike. 
 a. Subsidies between customers must also be transparent 
 and attentive to the impacts of various customers, as well as 
 distributional notions of vertical equity and customer fair-
 ness. 
  b. To ensure more rational price signals that avoid waste-
 ful consumption, regulators should presumptively set de-
 mand charges in customer bills based on total energy con-
 sumption, rather than using fixed fees that impose costs 
 across all customers regardless of how much energy a cus-
 tomer consumes. 
Based on these principles, the following sections survey some of 
the most promising policy responses by states and agencies, as 
well as Congress, to scale up and recalibrate internal subsidies 
to better unleash their potential for carbon reduction while also 
promoting efficiency and social welfare. 
B. STATE REFORMS TO CARBON TAXATION BY REGULATION 
Given their roles in approving new energy infrastructure 
policies and in setting retail rates, states will play an integral 
role in the use of internal subsidies to facilitate grid decarboni-
zation. While many states already use forms of carbon taxation 
by regulation, there is considerable room for improvement as 
states scale up, improve, and better coordinate their approaches. 
In order to avoid tension with interstate energy markets, states 
need to (1) better articulate and explain the benefits of internal 
subsidies, with a focus on energy system benefits; (2) be more 
mindful of spillover effects and provide for corrective measures; 
and (3) embrace regulatory approaches that are flexible and that 
address fairness and equity concerns. 
1. Articulating and Explaining Benefits 
Most states relying on internal subsidies impose these to 
pay for the costs of anticipated future energy needs provided by 
a specific energy resource. Where there is a good reason related 
to the energy system for making a distinction between different 
energy resources in the design of internal subsidies, states may 
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be justified in allocating costs differently for some customers.237 
In designing subsidies, however, states often proceed incremen-
tally and pay little or no attention to broader energy system ben-
efits or to how various subsidies interact. Apart from a regula-
tory conclusion that there is a need for a project and that it 
imposes prudent additional costs on ratepayers, little or no effort 
is typically made to articulate or explain the public goods asso-
ciated with these subsidies. Nor do state regulators make much 
effort to match the benefits of these subsidies with the customer 
base that benefits from them.238 
States will likely continue using mandates such as RPS 
standards to aim towards targets of fifty percent, eighty percent, 
and, in some instances when land and natural resources allow, 
even one hundred percent renewable energy targets. When re-
visiting these requirements, states should evaluate each power 
generation option that qualifies for an RPS for its carbon reduc-
tion value, better aligning RPS credits with the deep decarboni-
zation attributes for each resource. States can also improve en-
forcement and minimize carbon leakage by participating in 
 
 237. Beyond internal subsidies, neutrality is a broader concern with much 
state utility regulation. In order to ensure a level playing field for new power 
generation technologies, states should remove embedded regulatory barriers 
that serve as a subsidy in favor of incumbent firms and impede new non-utility 
renewable power projects. Regulators should remove prohibitions on non-utility 
applicants for project siting, and should favor efforts to unbundle generation 
from distribution in making decisions about new projects. In approving new pro-
jects, state regulators should avoid traditional least-cost assessments that fix-
ate solely on a project’s costs to investors and ratepayers, instead favoring eval-
uation of the system-wide project costs and benefits for each new project. They 
also should favor integrated planning approaches that compare the social costs 
and benefits of various projects. For a discussion of these concerns, see Brown 
& Rossi, supra note 97. 
 238. As another way of promoting resource and incumbent neutrality, states 
might consider revising the role of the distribution utility, not merely as a busi-
ness that sells power but as the provider of energy value for a decarbonized grid. 
In order to better align customer incentives with the pricing of energy, states 
should also aim to facilitate adoption of incentives that enable customer behav-
ior/investment choices, including decoupling, customer demand response, and 
deployment of smart metering. In order to encourage decisions about new 
power-supply resources that do not favor incumbent utilities and their existing 
power-supply resources, states should consider adopting an Independent Dis-
tribution Service Operator (IDSO) approach that unbundles management of the 
distribution grid (including customer energy resource interconnection and ac-
cess) from decisions regarding power supply. See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, Jon 
Wellinghoff: Utilities Should Not Operate the Distribution Grid, UTILITY DIVE 
(Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/jon-wellinghoff-utilities 
-should-not-operate-the-distribution-grid/298286. 
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regional efforts to align RPS requirements. They should author-
ize the costs of compliance with these requirements to be recov-
ered in customer rates, with particular attention to expanding 
the customer tax base by spreading their costs as broadly as pos-
sible. 
Under federal law, states are specifically assigned the role 
of setting avoided-cost rates as subsidies for encouraging non-
utility forms of power generation, including renewable power 
projects.239 In approaching avoided costs under PURPA, states 
should not limit their inquiry to short-run marginal economic 
costs of deploying existing power generators, which systemati-
cally favors resources such as natural gas. Rather, regulators 
should set avoided costs based on the future system-wide mar-
ginal cost specific to each resource, including environmental and 
other social costs associated with deep decarbonization. One way 
to accomplish this is to separately auction each desired energy 
supply resource, as determined by statewide or regional plan-
ning for future energy resource balance. 
States that have not done so should adopt net metering pro-
grams and, at the very minimum, billing credits should be set 
based on retail rates. States should also consider the adoption of 
feed-in tariff programs, with an eye towards providing long-term 
financial stability for targeted low-carbon power generation op-
tions. States with these programs should expand them based on 
the decarbonization attributes of different technologies, and rou-
tinely revisit that system-wide value of each resource vis-à-vis 
decarbonization. As with RPS requirements, the costs of these 
subsidies need to be authorized in customer rates and their costs 
spread as broadly as possible.240 
Beyond resource-specific mandates, states can also be ex-
pected to continue to pursue new subsidies for their own new 
low-carbon infrastructure projects. States need to be particularly 
attentive to ensuring resource and incumbent neutrality when 
 
 239. See Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and 
Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L.J. 419, 430–31 (1995) (explaining that states 
must consider prices from all energy sources when setting avoided cost). 
 240. Such subsidies should not be limited to states, but should recognize the 
potential of urban areas to finance their own initiatives along the lines of simi-
lar principles. State legislatures and regulators should encourage local govern-
ments to set their own goals and establish their own subsidies to help build 
clean-energy infrastructure, especially to the extent that this allows a munici-
pal government to draw on tax-free financing options. To encourage experimen-
tation, states should not limit the ability of local governments to adopt their 
own PACE programs, RPS and energy efficiency mandates, and incentive pro-
grams such as net metering. 
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designing these subsidies. They must also articulate and explain 
how these subsidies produce public goods that are not priced in 
by the interstate energy market. Subsidy design costs should be 
assessed to customers in a manner that is roughly proportionate 
to benefits—even where those who benefit from a subsidy are out 
of state. States should be mindful that stable regulatory incen-
tives can play an important role in reducing the uncertainty as-
sociated with low-carbon infrastructure,241 but to retain flexibil-
ity in financing new projects, carbon investment adders could be 
used to establish a state or regional fund and to offer competitive 
bidding for new low-carbon infrastructure projects.242 
Though forms of subsidies, the types of state initiatives de-
scribed above should be presumptively favored in interstate en-
ergy markets, despite recent case law that calls into question 
some state subsidies in interstate power markets. In 2016, the 
U.S. Supreme Court rejected Maryland’s incentives for the con-
struction of new natural gas plants, holding that they were 
preempted by FERC’s regulation of regional market rates for 
competitive wholesale power supply in the interstate market.243 
Read at face value, this decision calls into question many state 
power generation subsidies—an especially troubling develop-
ment given the need for new decarbonized sources of energy. 
The Maryland incentives for gas plants rejected by the Su-
preme Court were preempted by federal law because they disre-
garded a wholesale capacity sales rate FERC had presumptively 
approved as just and reasonable as a part of a multistate tariff 
proposed by PJM, the largest organized RTO market in the 
United States.244 Importantly, the Supreme Court’s decision 
does not affect the ability of regulated utilities that do not par-
ticipate in organized regional markets regulated by FERC to 
build subsidies for power supply resources into their retail rates. 
Moreover, as the Supreme Court clarified, its holding is narrow 
scope and does not “foreclose Maryland and other States from 
 
 241. See, e.g., Jonas J. Monast, Maximizing Utility in Electric Utility Regu-
lation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 160 (2015) (discussing how uncertainty about 
future carbon policy can produce harmful efficiency and social welfare effects 
for customer rates). 
 242. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
 243. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016). 
 244. Id. at 1294 (citation omitted) (“FERC extensively regulates the struc-
ture of the PJM capacity auction to ensure that it efficiently balances supply 
and demand, producing a just and reasonable clearing price.”); see also id. at 
1299 (“We reject Maryland’s program only because it disregards an interstate 
wholesale rate required by FERC.”). 
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encouraging production of new or clean generation through 
measures ‘untethered to a generator’s wholesale market partic-
ipation.’”245 The Court specifically refused to rule on “the permis-
sibility of various other measures States might employ to en-
courage development of new or clean generation, including tax 
incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-
owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sec-
tor.”246 Recent lower court decisions have resoundingly rejected 
preemption challenges to state subsidies for nuclear power 
plants,247 suggesting that initiatives aimed to promote low-car-
bon energy resources will likely be allowed to withstand any le-
gal scrutiny this 2016 Supreme Court decision invites. 
While state carbon subsidies may withstand legal challenge 
in interstate energy markets, to ensure consumer protection and 
neutrality towards new energy resources, stranded-cost compen-
sation favoring legacy power generators should be approached 
with caution. Unless policymakers make a concerted effort to as-
sess the carbon costs and broader energy-system benefits associ-
ated with regulatory transitions, they should generally disfavor 
stranded-cost compensation for incumbent power-supply re-
sources.248 
2. Addressing Jurisdictional Spillovers 
In setting internal subsidies, states also need to be attentive 
to jurisdictional spillovers, such as carbon leakage. Differences 
in regulatory mandates and subsidies across jurisdictions can 
exacerbate leakage, especially when while these differences are 
not tied to spillover benefits. 
To the extent states are using internal subsidies to advance 
public goods associated with broader energy system, such as new 
transmission lines to promote carbon reduction and reliability, 
 
 245. Id. at 1299. 
 246. Id. For further discussion, see Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy 
Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399 (2016). 
 247. See, e.g., Coal. for Competitive Elec., Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman, No. 16-
CV-8164 (VEC), 2017 WL 3172866 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017) (rejecting challenge 
to New York’s zero emission credit program on the grounds that challengers had 
failed to distinguish the program from renewable energy credits, which FERC 
had approved under the FPA); Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos. 17 CV 1163 
& 17 CV 1164, 2017 WL 3008289 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017) (rejecting preemption 
clause challenge to Illinois zero emission credits for nuclear plants on the 
grounds that there is no conflict with any existing FERC policy). 
 248. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 16. 
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they have the authority to impose some costs on out-of-state pro-
ducers and, to a degree, even consumers who benefit from 
them.249 Regulators might accomplish this through border ad-
justment fees on energy imports or exports, as long as these ad-
justments are proportionate to carbon and energy system im-
pacts and reciprocal across jurisdictions.250 Alternatively, a state 
could authorize or mandate transmission-owning utilities to par-
ticipate in a regional energy market (such as an RTO) that pro-
vides for some carbon-costing mechanism. These kinds of trans-
state initiatives may seem far-fetched, but some states could find 
them attractive as a way of warding off national adjustments 
through interstate energy markets. 
Effectively addressing spillover concerns may also require 
some realignment of regulatory institutions within states. In-
stead of leaving all electric-power policy decisions to a public ser-
vice commission focused on narrow protection of captive consum-
ers, states’ utility commissions need to better coordinate their 
internal subsidy policies with broader energy system goals. To 
recognize the interstate concerns associated with this and im-
prove communication across states, states might consider creat-
ing an office of energy or establishing some other gubernatorial-
level agency that has oversight authority over basic energy pol-
icy decisions with spillover costs and benefits, providing an op-
portunity to balance and tradeoff various values associated with 
a low-carbon transition and to address concerns such as reciproc-
ity with other states in the operation of energy markets.251 State 
legislatures should authorize state energy officials to participate 
in regional discussions, including interstate compact initiatives 
related to energy resources and electric power transmission. 
3. Fairness and Equity 
State utility regulators setting customer rates should move 
beyond their fixation on nondiscrimination as a principle that 
 
 249. Cf. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1087–93 
(9th Cir. 2013) (upholding a state renewable fuel standard against a dormant 
commerce clause challenge even though it imposed a higher burden on out of 
state producers, based in part on recognition that it created benefits beyond 
California’s border). 
 250. See id. at 1092–94 (upholding a state renewable fuel standard in part 
because it was focused on actual carbon emissions and applied to both in- and 
out-of-state producers). 
 251. This may require reform to ex parte communication limits so that, out-
side of disputed cases, energy regulators are allowed to discuss policy priorities 
and their alignment with other state officials. 
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only protects horizontal equity, or treating all retail customers 
alike. While horizontal equity represents an important dimen-
sion of any just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rate, it is not 
the only relevant consideration. Vertical equity concerns must 
also be considered. In setting subsidies, regulators need to focus 
on the customer fairness and distributional consequences of dif-
ferent pricing approaches. This is particularly important as reg-
ulators adopt and reassess customer surcharges and billing cred-
its related to net metering, but by no means should it be limited 
to this context. 
In addressing these concerns in customer billing charges, 
regulators confront customer charges with an eye towards trans-
parency. As a general matter, regulators should avoid setting or 
adjusting customer charges: (1) in narrowly focused proceedings; 
or (2) in reaction to concerns about customer cost impacts of a 
specific program without looking to broader customer impacts 
and overall energy system benefits. They also should be mindful 
of customer ability to pay insofar as it can affect customer sub-
stitution away from energy resources, and where this concern is 
warranted, impose resource-neutral customer exit fees.252 
Where regulatory requirements or internal subsidies are paid for 
through customer billing charges, regulators should presump-
tively favor per kWh customer charges rather than fixed fees or 
cost adders which apply equally to all customer bills. In design-
ing these charges, broader energy system benefits, including de-
mand reduction and conservation, also need to be taken into ac-
count, recognizing that in some instances some customers should 
pay a higher price for energy based on consumption levels. 
 
 252. Resource neutrality is an important condition to such exit fees. For ex-
ample, if a utility offers a rooftop solar program that allows for third-party fi-
nancing, then it might be appropriate for a utility to limit the ability of custom-
ers to exit for purposes of participating in another rooftop solar financing 
program. However, if like most utilities in the U.S., no third-party financing 
option is made available to customers, it would not be resource neutral for a 
utility to impose an exit fee or for it to prohibit customers from participating in 
such a program. For a parallel approach to addressing neutrality concerns in 
utility regulation, see SZ Enterprises, LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 
466–68 (Iowa 2014), as corrected (Aug. 14, 2014) (noting that a third-party solar 
provider transaction is not subject to state utility regulation because the incum-
bent utility does not offer customers the same services). 
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C. FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THE EXPANSION OF INTERNAL 
SUBSIDIES 
Even if Congress does not take any action related to grid de-
carbonization, under existing law federal agencies have author-
ity to take significant steps on their own. This Section details a 
few immediate and long-term initiatives FERC and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) can pursue to leverage the bet-
ter use of internal subsidies in the transition to grid decarboni-
zation. These policy approaches do not require any additional 
congressional authorization and reinforce embedded principles 
of ratemaking: 
1. Encouraging the Pricing of Public Goods in Energy Markets 
EPA is the primary regulator of environmental emissions 
and related harms, not FERC. However, in making decisions 
surrounding energy infrastructure, FERC has many opportuni-
ties to consider the carbon impacts of its regulatory decisions.253 
The agency’s determinations on just and reasonable rates in 
interstate power markets give it substantial leeway to determine 
what does and does not produce value in interstate power mar-
kets, and to set market prices to correct for any disparity be-
tween energy-system value and market price. Since each energy 
resource has a different impact on the power grid, a failure to 
recognize the carbon or reliability attributes of different energy 
sources in energy market prices can cause distortions in market 
pricing. Under the FPA just and reasonable rate principle, FERC 
has the authority to adopt grid-system-reliability adders reflect-
ing the carbon attributes of different energy resources when ap-
proving regional transmission rates for the sale of energy in in-
terstate wholesale power markets.254 Such charges would 
 
 253. Elsewhere, FERC has been criticized for failing to sufficiently consider 
carbon impacts in its decisions approving electric power and natural gas pro-
jects over which it has jurisdiction. See Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Down-
stream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA 
Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 137–38 (2017) (listing a series of cases 
involving FERC’s application of NEPA). In approving natural gas pipelines, 
FERC also needs to be more attentive to long-term downstream carbon impacts 
and needs to better engage state environmental regulators in its decision-mak-
ing process. See Alexandra Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism 
Battle in Energy Transportation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423 (2017). 
 254. See, e.g., [2 FERC] STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, U.C. BERKE-
LEY CTR FOR. L., ENERGY, & ENV’T, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT 
LEGISLATION, § 3.1–.2 (July 2014), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/CLEE/ 
FERC_Report_FINAL.pdf (discussing FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction over 
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probably require FERC to make a finding that regional trans-
mission system adequacy would be imperiled without the relia-
bility attributes provided from non-fossil fuel energy re-
sources.255 
As a pathway for integrating carbon costs into energy mar-
kets without setting a nationwide carbon price, FERC could 
adopt regulations encouraging regional power markets to de-
velop their own carbon adders for transmission service. Perhaps 
where an RTO has not done so, FERC (in consultation with EPA) 
could set default adders for transmission rates in each region of 
the country. Like environmental adders in utility rates, the ad-
ditional revenues collected from these system-reliability adders 
could directly flow back to the power suppliers creating this 
value, providing additional incentives for their participation in 
interstate power markets. Alternatively, additional revenue 
could fund state initiatives to promote low-carbon resources and 
be allocated to private firms based on competitive bidding. Re-
gions that have adopted carbon cap-and-trade initiatives that ex-
tend to all sources of power supply should be entitled to some 
relief from these adders, but FERC (in consultation with EPA) 
could provide for appropriate adjustments. An advantage of 
these kinds of adders is that they could be passed on to retail 
customers based on prices determined in the interstate market 
without each state making its own cost-of-carbon determination. 
Even without endorsing energy market prices that reflect 
the carbon attributes of various energy resources, FERC could 
help promote resource neutrality in its approval of transmission-
operator dispatch-priority rules. Current grid operator dispatch 
protocols favor least-cost deployment of power-supply resources, 
which advantage existing fossil fuel baseload resources over re-
newable energy resources. FERC needs to adopt a rule or guid-
ance document addressing the expectations for resource prioriti-
zation in organized wholesale power markets. Rather than 
favoring least-cost dispatch, based solely on the marginal eco-
nomic (or nominal) costs of energy, the agency’s policies should 
encourage grid operators to base their energy dispatch decisions 
 
wholesale markets and stating FERC could include “a carbon adder” in whole-
sale electricity rates); Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, Toward 
Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 
302–06 (2014) (discussing FERC’s rate regulation authority and noting that en-
vironmental considerations should not be precluded). 
 255. See Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority To Transform the Elec-
tric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1839–40 (2016) (discussing FERC’s au-
thority to adopt such a grid system adder). 
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on the real value of marginal energy resource for the grid—
which depends on a balance of reliability, energy security and 
environmental considerations.256 
FERC itself does not have the authority to site new sources 
of power supply (a role the reserved to states under statute), but 
the FPA gives the agency expansive authority to address prac-
tices that affect the sale of energy in interstate commerce.257 
With interstate energy markets, the agency already considers 
this as including the overall balance of different supply resources 
that make up each region’s power generation portfolio. FERC’s 
Order 1000 envisions that FERC has a role in ensuring that 
state RPSs and other policies regarding power-generation deci-
sions are taken into account in the regional transmission plan-
ning process.258 In addition to monitoring compliance with Order 
1000, FERC might evaluate other ways in which it can encour-
age the pricing of environmental and reliability attributes of var-
ious energy resources in organized interstate power markets, 
perhaps by requiring RTOs and transmitting utilities to show 
that they have taken the reliability, energy security and envi-
ronmental attributes of a power generation portfolio seriously 
before approving their transmission planning proposals. 
FERC may not be able to do all of this on its own. Coordina-
tion across federal agencies will also be essential to clarifying 
priorities in promoting new sources of power generation with the 
transition to deep decarbonization.259 Unless a federal statute 
indicates otherwise, either FERC or the Department of Energy 
(DOE) should serve as the lead agency in coordinating initiatives 
related to electric power and a decarbonized grid. Much as in the 
setting of auto emission standards, information sharing will be 
integral to this endeavor. Decarbonization initiatives should pre-
sent a particularly propitious opportunity for FERC and EPA to 
work together more proactively. It would benefit both agencies 
to pursue consultation strategies in the early phases of policy 
 
 256. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (referencing the renewable 
power industry challenge to PJM’s capacity market rules in the D.C. Circuit). 
 257. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (2012) (sections 205 & 206 of the FPA, respec-
tively); see also Eisen, supra note 255, at 1791–97 (discussing FERC’s regula-
tory authority under the FPA). 
 258. Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs., 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, 18 C.F.R. pt. 
35 (2011), aff ’d per curiam, S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014). 
 259. For a discussion of the benefits and pitfalls of various interagency coor-
dination strategies, see Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in 
Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
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development. In addition, to the extent that the implementation 
of regulation anticipates future inter-agency conflicts, both 
agencies should commit to memoranda of understanding and, 
where appropriate, consider the adoption of binding joint rules 
to clarify their respective roles. 
2. Clarifying Nondiscrimination Principles 
As attention to the carbon attributes continues to increase, 
transmission will remain the lifeblood of interstate power mar-
kets. This makes it even more important that FERC get nondis-
crimination principles right. Sections 205 and 206 the FPA apply 
not only to incumbent sources of energy, but can be expected to 
apply in the future to an even more diverse range of power sup-
ply resources.260 Traditionally, FERC has interpreted nondis-
crimination narrowly, to mean not treating different wholesale 
power supply customers differently. As discussed above, FERC 
has already begun to endorse broad-based customer subsidies in 
approving cost allocation for new transmission lines, following a 
finding of shared benefits or some effort to quantify benefits to 
customers. Also, as FERC recognized with its demand response 
order,261 the notion of nondiscrimination in the FPA authorizes 
the agency to consider inputs to wholesale power supply sales or 
related energy services, including customer energy efficiency 
and other customer resources such as battery storage. With a 
decarbonized grid, FERC must continue to recognize how its 
nondiscrimination mandates not only require it to pay attention 
to downstream considerations (such as rates for transmission 
and traditional bulk power sales), but also consider upstream 
grid inputs (such as customer energy resources that need to con-
nect to the grid) and related energy services that affect interstate 
power markets. 
Moreover, at least to date, FERC has failed to interpret its 
public interest mandate as extending to the carbon-costs associ-
ated with integrating various energy resources into the grid. Un-
der section 210 of the FPA, the agency has the authority to man-
date transmission interconnection where it is in the “public 
 
 260. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e.  
 261. Order No. 745, FERC Stats. & Regs., 134 FERC ¶ 61,187, 18 C.F.R. pt. 
35 (2011), aff ’d, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 773–74 
(2016), as revised (Jan. 28, 2016) (recognizing FERC’s authority to regulate 
wholesale demand response as a “practice[] ‘affecting’” its rates, under sections 
205 and 206 of the FPA). 
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interest.”262 FERC could facilitate greater renewable power pro-
ject participation in interstate power markets by issuing a policy 
statement finding that interconnections for renewable power fa-
cilities presumptively meet the agency’s public interest stand-
ard.263 
Related to nondiscrimination is PURPA’s requirement that 
utilities purchase surplus power from certain types of genera-
tors, including renewable power projects.264 Congress initially 
intended PURPA’s purchase obligations to apply to renewable 
power projects, including nondispatchable resources, such as so-
lar and wind.265 In 2005, Congress significantly scaled back 
PURPA’s reach, adopting an exemption from PURPA’s purchase 
obligation where utilities lack market power.266 
But these 2005 amendments to PURPA did not instruct 
FERC to throw out the baby with the bathwater. If a qualifying 
renewable power resource lacks access to the wholesale market, 
due perhaps to transmission constraints of discriminatory pric-
ing, it does not seem appropriate for FERC to allow a finding of 
no market power. FERC should thus avoid granting broad waiv-
ers to utility buyback and avoided-cost obligations for renewable 
power facilities under the 2005 amendments where market fail-
ures impede renewable power projects’ access to competitive in-
terstate markets.267 In similar spirit, FERC could provide a pro-
cess for states to seek pre-approval of incentives and issue new 
avoided cost guidelines that provide states presumptive ways to 
 
 262. 16 U.S.C. § 824i(c)(1). 
 263. For a parallel recommendation regarding interconnection, see WEISS-
MAN & WEBB, supra note 254, at 17 (discussing the benefits if FERC issued a 
policy statement “acknowledging that interconnections for renewable genera-
tors will ordinarily meet” FPA section 210 requirements). 
 264. See Exelon Wind 1, LLC v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(stating PURPA “requires utilities to purchase power generated by Qualifying 
Facilities,” so long as certain conditions are met, in order to reduce utilities’ 
dependence on foreign energy sources). 
 265. Based on deference to a state agency, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit has held otherwise. See Exelon Wind, 766 F.3d at 395–97 (uphold-
ing Texas PUC requirement that only qualifying facilities delivering firm power 
qualify for legally enforceable obligations under PURPA, despite argument that 
this was inconsistent with FERC’s regulations). 
 266. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 1253, § 210, 119 
Stat. 594, 967–70 (2005) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3). 
 267. For a similar recommendation, see WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 254, 
at 10–11 (stating “[c]areful consideration” should be given to exercising FERC’s 
power to exempt utilities from their obligation under PURPA). 
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comply with PURPA, with avoided-cost programs promoting 
low-carbon power supply.268 
Also, to date FERC has failed to recognize how power distri-
bution sometimes produces discriminatory effects in interstate 
wholesale markets. While states retain primary authority over 
power distribution facilities and retail sales under statute, cer-
tain aspects of distribution that impede a competitive and fair 
interstate power market potentially extend into FERC’s jurisdic-
tional wheelhouse. FERC might consider drawing from its suc-
cesses in encouraging formation of RTOs to make necessary mar-
ket discrimination findings and adopting a similar rule to 
encourage formation of wholesale Distribution Service Organi-
zations (DSOs)—at least to the extent DSOs engage in power 
sales transactions subject to FERC’s jurisdiction. Like FERC’s 
RTO rule, such an approach need not be mandatory but could 
allow utilities to participate in distributed wholesale markets to 
opt in to FERC regulation of certain transactions, as long as they 
voluntarily unbundle distribution from generation. A standard 
wholesale DSO tariff could enable and allow for distribution in-
terconnection standards. As important, it would help to facilitate 
nondiscriminatory pricing for distributed customer energy re-
sources, including residential solar, and energy storage and de-
mand response, especially in states that prohibit these resources 
from accessing the interstate wholesale market. FERC’s en-
dorsement of such an approach would encourage more states to 
consider their own initiatives to promote fair competition in re-
tail electric-power distribution activities, which remain within 
state jurisdiction.269 
3. Reducing Federalism Uncertainty 
 As discussed above, a 2016 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
calls into question some state subsidies that present distortions 
 
 268. While FERC has provided little in the way of systematic policy updates 
to its original avoided-cost regulations, a number of government and private 
reports have surveyed and evaluated various avoided cost methodologies. See, 
e.g., PAUL DENHOLM ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., METHODS FOR AN-
ALYZING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DISTRIBUTED PHOTOVOLTAIC GENERA-
TION TO THE U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (2014), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/ 
fy14osti/62447.pdf; GREG DOTSON & BEN BOVARNICK, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
A FORWARD-LOOKING AGENDA FOR THE NATION’S PUBLIC UTILITY COMMIS-
SIONS (2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/ 
PURPA-report-final.pdf. 
 269. See supra Part IV.B. 
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to interstate power markets as regulated by FERC.270 To date, 
legal challenges to state subsidies on preemption grounds follow-
ing this 2016 decision have not been successful.271 Still, much 
uncertainty continues to surround state subsidies, especially 
subsidies aimed at promoting nuclear power. FERC could reduce 
this uncertainty by clarifying the continued permissibility of 
state clean-energy incentives and subsidies unless FERC ex-
pressly preempts them in a specific context, for example, via ad-
judicative order or adoption of a notice-and-comment rule. Such 
an approach might presumptively favor state internal subsidies 
that are explained on terms of carbon reduction or reliability 
benefits as long as some effort is made to address their spillover 
implications, so as to minimize distortions in interstate energy 
markets. 
D. A LEGISLATIVE PLATFORM FOR CARBON TAXATION BY 
REGULATION 
As I have argued, it is not necessary for Congress to adopt a 
national tax in order for carbon taxation by regulation to more 
effectively advance a low-carbon energy grid. But without doubt, 
additional legislation could provide a platform for unleashing 
the potential of internal subsidies. Even if Congress does not 
adopt any new federal requirements for private firms or states, 
with only modest adjustments to existing law it can significantly 
improve the coordination of internal subsidies by improving the 
information available to firms and policymakers and leveling the 
investment playing field for low-carbon infrastructure. 
1. Coordinating State Clean Energy Requirements 
Congress could play an integral role towards better aligning 
state requirements and internal subsidies to avoid negative ju-
risdictional spillover effects, such as carbon leakage, in inter-
state energy markets. RPS requirements, used by more than half 
the states today, demonstrate the need for better interstate co-
ordination. Recognizing the successes in more than half the 
states with RPS and EERS requirements, Congress could mini-
mize tensions that state programs present for interstate power 
 
 270. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text (discussing Hughes v. 
Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016)). 
 271. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing litigation post-
Hughes). 
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markets by adopting a national clean energy standard (CES).272 
A CES considered by Congress in 2012 (in legislation proposed 
by New Mexico Senator Jeff Bingaman) would have adopted a 
standard of eighty-four percent clean energy by 2035, although 
this draft legislation included partial credits for natural gas, nu-
clear and hydro-electric power.273 The EIA estimated that this 
proposed national CES would produce a twenty percent reduc-
tion in electric power sector carbon emissions by 2025 and a 
forty-four percent reduction by 2035—with a modest impact on 
customer rates (less than four percent by 2025 and eighteen per-
cent by 2035).274 
If Congress were to set an ambitious national standard for 
renewable energy, one approach would be to draw on the consen-
sus of state approaches, which already set targets for partici-
pants in most energy markets. A national target could be set to 
automatically ratchet up every five years to require a renewable 
power target based on the average of existing state targets for 
that period.275 Drawing from other cooperative federalism ap-
proaches in energy and environmental legislation, such a na-
tional CES requirement could serve as a regulatory floor, allow-
ing states to adopt more stringent standards.276 Additionally, 
 
 272. A national CES mandate would integrate both renewable and energy 
efficiency credits based on energy sales, and could be applied directly to utilities 
(based on the approach of state RPS and EERS programs) or against individual 
states (based on the approach of cooperative federalism statutes such as the 
Clean Air Act). Alternatively, Congress could follow the approach of most states 
and adopt separate quotas for renewable energy and energy efficiency; this dual 
target approach is important to ensuring that energy efficiency is not relegated 
a back seat to the expansion of power supply resources, although this concern 
can also be addressed by including a minimum energy efficiency “carve out” 
within an integrated national CES. 
 273. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAN ENERGY 
STANDARD ACT OF 2012, at 1 (2012), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ 
bces12/pdf/cesbing.pdf. The non-hydro renewable power portion of this target 
was estimated as roughly twenty-five percent. See id. at 7. 
 274. Id. at 4; see also A Clean Energy Standard Could Reduce Electric Sector 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 4, 2012), http:// 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6130. 
 275. For further elaboration of how the national government should adopt 
more rigorous regulatory standards based on what a plurality, majority, or su-
permajority of states do, see GANESH SITARAMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RE-
FORMING REGULATION: POLICIES TO COUNTERACT CAPTURE AND IMPROVE THE 
REGULATORY PROCESS 7–8 (2016), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/ 
uploads/2016/10/31114707/RegulationReformBrief.pdf.  
 276. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 28, at 1294 (discussing Congress’s 
choice to set the Clean Water Act as a regulatory floor while allowing states to 
adopt more stringent standards). 
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Congress should mandate that states provide for retail-rate cost 
recovery for compliance with a national CES.277 
Independent of whether Congress adopts a national CES re-
quirement, legislation could easily correct some important de-
fects current state RPS plans present for energy markets. One 
modest approach would be to create a national clean-energy 
credit program to facilitate and standardize national markets for 
tradable credits and address interstate carbon leakage prob-
lems. Any national program should allow utilities that do not 
generate clean energy themselves the flexibility to establish 
compliance with state programs through the purchase of these 
credits and to pass on their cost in customer rates. 
2. Improving Information About Carbon-Reduction Subsidies 
President Obama’s administration required agencies sub-
ject to presidential oversight to consider a social cost of carbon 
in agency regulatory initiatives, though the present administra-
tion has rejected this approach.278 In order to provide better in-
formation about the use of carbon subsidies, Congress should 
consider requiring the examination of carbon costs in agency reg-
ulatory impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis, including 
by independent agencies and federal agencies allocating funding 
to state and local governments.279 It could begin by applying car-
bon-impact analysis to its own tax and subsidy initiatives. The 
 
 277. Similarly, Congress could adopt a national ZEV mandate, to help ease 
the fleet transition towards electrification. Even if a federal ZEV standard is 
not adopted, Congress should authorize NHTSA as well as EPA to adopt credit 
multipliers for fuel efficiency standards to encourage ZEV alternatives such as 
electrification. Congress could also clarify that states have authority to adopt 
their own more ambitious ZEVs, and are not preempted by any federal goals. 
 278. See Press Release, The White House: Office of the Press Sec’y, Presi-
dential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic 
Growth (Mar. 28, 2017), http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/ 
presidential-executive-order-promoting-energy-independence-and-economi-1; 
see also Dan Farber, Whither the Social Cost of Carbon?, LEGALPLANET (May 
22, 2017), http://legal-planet.org/2017/05/22/whither-the-social-cost-of-carbon 
(noting the Trump Administration withdrew the Obama Administration’s 
standard estimate of the social cost of carbon and directed each agency to con-
duct their own estimate, which could prove scientifically—and legally—diffi-
cult); Chelsea Harvey, The Coming Battle Between Economists and the Trump 
Team over the True Cost of Climate Change, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2016), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/12/22/the 
-coming-battle-between-the-trump-team-and-economists-over-the-true-cost-of 
-climate-change (observing that the Trump Administration will likely stop con-
sidering the social cost of carbon in its rule making process). 
 279. In similar spirit, Sarah Light has argued that carbon cost disclosure in 
agency NEPA analysis can serve as a quasi-carbon tax. See Sarah E. Light, 
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Joint Committee on Taxation and other governmental bodies, for 
example, could evaluate the cost effectiveness of new and exist-
ing tax subsidies for various energy sources based on the social 
cost of carbon. In assessing sunset and reauthorization for tax 
benefits for various energy resources, it also could provide infor-
mation regarding the comparative carbon attributes and bene-
fits (if any) associated with each kind of credit or deduction. 
Congress also should strengthen EIA’s role as an infor-
mation resource, by requiring it to report annually to Congress 
regarding progress towards carbon reduction in the energy sec-
tor. EIA has advantages over other agencies in measuring car-
bon emissions related to electric power, given its history of inde-
pendent collection of information and expertise in the energy 
sector.280 EIA should be authorized to collect information, to ver-
ify its accuracy and integrity, and build and continuously main-
tain databases regarding state subsidies and their positive and 
negative impacts on carbon reduction, efficiency, and social wel-
fare. Such information could prove particularly important in 
helping states to set fair and reciprocal border adjustments to 
address any spillover problems such as carbon leakage. EIA 
should be fully funded to serve as the default agency for more 
proactively sharing information about carbon reduction activi-
ties across DOE, FERC, EPA, the Department of Transportation, 
and states. 
3. Leveling the Playing Field 
Current tax incentives are not neutral, favoring projects 
that produce energy over those that promote efficient use of en-
ergy. Congress could advance resource and incumbent neutrality 
through the reform of existing tax credits and benefits for energy 
resources. In lieu of existing tax credits, which focus on project 
investment or production, any favorable tax treatment for a new 
infrastructure project needs to be tied to the actual value it cre-
ates. Favorable tax treatment should not only be extended to 
projects based on energy production, but to new investments 
that reduce energy consumption, especially during peak times. 
 
NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 
87 TUL. L. REV. 511 (2013). 
 280. See Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 204, 
95 Stat. 565, 572–74 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7135 (2012)) 
(establishing the EIA and its mission of “carrying out a central, comprehensive, 
and unified energy data and information program” to “collect, evaluate, assem-
ble, analyze, and disseminate” energy information and data). 
 340 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:277 
 
Congress could also adopt legislation to help level the play-
ing field for energy infrastructure investors. Tax-exempt bond 
status could be extended to “green bond”281 activities that meet 
a carbon-benefit test, including those that are issued by special-
purposes district governments—for example, municipal govern-
ment development of brownfield sites for purposes such as re-
newable power generation. If Congress revisits municipal tax 
benefits, a social cost of carbon assessment could be used to de-
termine which public energy infrastructure investments deci-
sions qualify for tax-exempt bond financing. In recognition of the 
fact that neutral access to public capital markets is essential for 
new investments in low-carbon energy production, adoption of 
the Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act282 would extend fa-
vorable tax treatment of master limited partnerships and what 
are known as yieldcos283—financing arrangements not presently 
available for most renewable project investors—on similar terms 
to those investing in fossil fuel projects.284 Real Estate Invest-
ment Trust (REIT) activities could also be expanded to include 
low-carbon energy projects related to building efficiency and cus-
tomer renewable power investments.285 Finally, local subsidies 
to promote low-carbon energy could be encouraged with legisla-
tion that supports PACE residential programs—for example, re-
quiring the Federal Housing Financing Agency to allow Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase residential mortgages while 
 
 281. Green Bonds Attract Private Sector Climate Finance, WORLD BANK 
(June 10, 2015), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/green 
-bonds-climate-finance (stating green bonds “are fixed income, liquid financial 
instruments that are used to raise funds dedicated to climate-mitigation, adap-
tation, and other environment-friendly projects”). 
 282. S. 1656, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 283. See Linette Lopez, Wall Street’s Getting Crushed by a Form of Financial 
Engineering You’ve Probably Never Heard Of, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 2, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-a-yieldco-and-how-is-it-killing-wall 
-street-2015-11 (explaining generally “yieldcos”). 
 284. See Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, ALL. TO SAVE ENERGY, 
(Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.ase.org/resources/master-limited-partnerships 
-parity-act; see also Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, Smarter Finance for Cleaner 
Energy: Open Up Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) and Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts (REITs) to Renewable Energy Investment, REMAKING FEDERALISM: 
RENEWING THE ECON. (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2012, at 
3–5, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/13-clean-energy 
-investment.pdf. 
 285. See Mormann & Reicher, supra note 284, at 3–5 (discussing how REITs 
could be used to promote clean energy). 
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also providing benchmarks to help minimize financial risks to 
mortgage holders.286 
  CONCLUSION   
In a similar manner to Elon Musk’s analogy between gar-
bage collection fees and a carbon tax, energy law already has be-
gun to look to customer rates to subsidize a transition to a low-
carbon grid. Regardless of a national carbon tax’s precarious po-
litical fate, energy regulators today are pursuing multiple inter-
nal subsidy pathways for carbon reduction, albeit in a frag-
mented manner. Decentralization in these approaches is not 
unwelcome, insofar as it is flexible and promotes experimenta-
tion—benefits that Posner identified half a century ago287 and 
that environmental law scholars continue to advocate for to-
day.288 
At the same time, carbon taxation as regulation has not re-
alized its full potential and could benefit from a critical assess-
ment of its efficacy in advancing efficiency and social welfare in 
modern interstate energy markets. Regulators approving inter-
nal subsidies need to be attentive to neutrality, cost spreading, 
jurisdictional spillover concerns and notions of fairness and eq-
uity (both horizontal and vertical) in setting customer rates. Ab-
sent a significant change to federal law, states will continue to 
exercise primary regulatory authority over the location of power-
supply resources and retail customer rates—and much of the ac-
tion with internal subsidies will occur at the state level. At the 
same time, federal policies can be used to promote a spirit of in-
novation among states in the use of internal subsidies to promote 
carbon reduction and to reduce negative spillover effects associ-
ated with state initiatives. The federal government is also 
uniquely positioned to provide better information about carbon 
reduction and to leverage consensus that has emerged surround-
ing internal subsidies and their operation in energy markets. 
 
 286. Devashree Saha, Enact Legislation Supporting Residential Property As-
sessed Clean Energy Financing (PACE), REMAKING FEDERALISM: RENEWING 
THE ECON. (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2012, at 3, https:// 
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/13-housing-energy-efficiency 
.pdf. 
 287. See Posner, supra note 11, at 45–47 (discussing the advantages of in-
ternal subsides). 
 288. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 220, at 880–92 (discussing how decen-
tralization has led to innovation).  
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Even though adoption of a national carbon tax seems highly 
unlikely, carbon taxation by regulation has arrived and contin-
ues to expand in significance. As regulators address the transi-
tion to a low-carbon energy system, continuing to treat internal 
subsidies for each energy resource in isolation will limit the abil-
ity of modern energy markets to efficiently price energy based on 
its value and promote social welfare. This Article has made a 
first cut at addressing how internal subsidies can be improved 
through only incremental tweaks in regulatory approach. By 
making some of these changes, energy regulators today can 
make a carbon tax less elusive, advancing its core policies and 
principles in setting customer rates. 
